Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force
Abstract
Other research has shown (1) that civilians and the military differ in their views about when and how to use military force; (2) that the opinions of veterans track more closely with military officers than with civilians who never served in the military; and (3) that U.S. civil–military relations shaped Cold War policy debates. We assess whether this opinion gap “matters” for the actual conduct of American foreign policy. We examine the impact of the presence of veterans in the U.S. political elite on the propensity to initiate and escalate militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 1992. As the percentage of veterans serving in the executive branch and the legislature increases, the probability that the United States will initiate militarized disputes declines. Once a dispute has been initiated, however, the higher the proportion of veterans, the greater the level of force the United States will use in the dispute.
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Stewart and Zhukov (2009) show that Russian military elites are more activist in considering the use of force than their political counterparts, in contrast to conventional wisdom.
“Stewart and Zhukov (2009) use similar results to show that Russian military elites are actually more activist in considering the use of force than their political counterparts, in contrast to the conventional wisdom (Gelpi and Feaver 2002).”
From Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts (2013) · cites this paper as Gelpi and Feaver 2002
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Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts
Grimmer, J., & Stewart, B. M. (2013) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mps028 · Cited by 3,297 · see citing works
- Authors
- Gelpi, C., & Feaver, P. D.
- Affiliations
- Duke University (US)
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2002-12
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 779-793
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2115680183
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 38 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 19 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 13.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Military and Defense Studies
- Keywords
- veterans, political elites, civil-military relations, use of force, militarized interstate disputes, escalation, military personnel, executive branch, legislatures, US foreign policy, Cold War
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