Cited by 179International Relations and Foreign PolicyPolitical Conflict and GovernanceMilitary and Defense Studies

Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force

Gelpi, Christopher, Feaver, Peter D.·2002·American Political Science Review

Abstract

Other research has shown (1) that civilians and the military differ in their views about when and how to use military force; (2) that the opinions of veterans track more closely with military officers than with civilians who never served in the military; and (3) that U.S. civil–military relations shaped Cold War policy debates. We assess whether this opinion gap “matters” for the actual conduct of American foreign policy. We examine the impact of the presence of veterans in the U.S. political elite on the propensity to initiate and escalate militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 1992. As the percentage of veterans serving in the executive branch and the legislature increases, the probability that the United States will initiate militarized disputes declines. Once a dispute has been initiated, however, the higher the proportion of veterans, the greater the level of force the United States will use in the dispute.

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Crossref · 10.1017/s000305540200045x

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  • Stewart and Zhukov (2009) show that Russian military elites are more activist in considering the use of force than their political counterparts, in contrast to conventional wisdom.

    “Stewart and Zhukov (2009) use similar results to show that Russian military elites are actually more activist in considering the use of force than their political counterparts, in contrast to the conventional wisdom (Gelpi and Feaver 2002).”

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Authors
Gelpi, C., & Feaver, P. D.
Affiliations
Duke University (US)
Venue
American Political Science Review
Published
2002-12
Volume
96
Issue
4
Pages
779-793
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
OpenAlex
W2115680183
Cited by
179
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 38 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 19 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 4
FWCI
13.96
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Military and Defense Studies
Keywords
veterans, political elites, civil-military relations, use of force, militarized interstate disputes, escalation, military personnel, executive branch, legislatures, US foreign policy, Cold War

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