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Cited by 84Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationPolitical and Economic history of UK and USPolitical Theory and Democracy

Ideology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in the British Parliament

SLAPIN, JONATHAN B., KIRKLAND, JUSTIN H., LAZZARO, JOSEPH A., LESLIE, PATRICK A., O’GRADY, TOM·2018·American Political Science Review
DOI 10.1017/s0003055417000375
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Abstract

Strong party discipline is a core feature of Westminster parliamentary systems. Parties typically compel members of Parliament (MPs) to support the party regardless of MPs’ individual preferences. Rebellion, however, does occur. Using an original dataset of MP votes and speeches in the British House of Commons from 1992 to 2015, coupled with new estimations of MPs’ ideological positions within their party, we find evidence that MPs use rebellion strategically to differentiate themselves from their party. The strategy that MPs employ is contingent upon an interaction of ideological extremity with party control of government. Extremists are loyal when their party is in the opposition, but these same extremists become more likely to rebel when their party controls government. Additionally, they emphasize their rebellion through speeches. Existing models of rebellion and party discipline do not account for government agenda control and do not explain these patterns.

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  • The approach yields novel insights about the relationship between the UK Prime Minister and his backbenchers on the European Union.

    “We build on earlier work (e.g., Osnabrügge, Hobolt, and Rodon 2021;Slapin et al. 2018) for the UK House of Commons, yielding novel insights about the relationship between the UK Prime Minister and his backbenchers on the European Union.”

    From Embedding Regression: Models for Context-Specific Description and Inference (2023) · cites this paper as Slapin et al. 2018

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Authors
SLAPIN, J. B., KIRKLAND, J. H., LAZZARO, J. A., LESLIE, P. A., & O’GRADY, T.
Affiliations
  • University of Essex (GB)
  • University of Houston (US)
  • University College London (GB)
Corresponding author
  • SLAPIN, JONATHAN B.
  • KIRKLAND, JUSTIN H.
  • LAZZARO, JOSEPH A.
  • LESLIE, PATRICK A.
  • O’GRADY, TOM
ORCID
Venue
American Political Science Review
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2017-09-11
Volume
112
Issue
1
Pages
15-30
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
DOI
10.1017/s0003055417000375
OpenAlex
W2756371063
Cited by
84
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 3 · 2016: 1
FWCI
25.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified)
Locations
  • American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
  • Open Access at Essex (University of Essex) (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political and Economic history of UK and US
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
Keywords
party discipline, ideological extremity, House of Commons, British Parliament, party control of government

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