The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin’s ‘Terror by Hunger’
Abstract
States use repression to enforce obedience, but repression—especially if it is violent, massive, and indiscriminate—often incites opposition. Why does repression have such disparate effects? We address this question by studying the political legacy of Stalin’s coercive agricultural policy and collective punishment campaign in Ukraine, which led to the death by starvation of over three million people in 1932–34. Using rich micro-level data on eight decades of local political behavior, we find that communities exposed to Stalin’s “terror by hunger” behaved more loyally toward Moscow when the regime could credibly threaten retribution in response to opposition. In times when this threat of retribution abated, the famine-ridden communities showed more opposition to Moscow, both short- and long-term. Thus, repression can both deter and inflame opposition, depending on the political opportunity structure in which post-repression behavior unfolds.
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Cites
(1970) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 3,500
The Logic of Violence in Civil War
Kalyvas, S. N. (2006) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818462 · Cited by 3,314
Political opportunity structures and political protest: anti-nuclear movements in four democracies
Kitschelt, H. P. (1986) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s000712340000380x · Cited by 2,563
The Logic of Violence in Civil War
(2006) · The Logic of Violence in Civil War · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818462.001 · Cited by 2,402
Dray, S., Legendre, P., & Peres-Neto, P. R. (2006) · Ecological Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2006.02.015 · Cited by 2,003
Bayesian Model Averaging for Linear Regression Models
Raftery, A. E., Hoeting, J. A., & Madigan, D. (1997) · Cited by 1,746
State Repression and Political Order
Davenport, C. (2007) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216 · Cited by 1,564 · cited 2×
“1 We define “repression” (or “violence”more generally) as “physical sanctions against an individual or organization […] for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target aswell as deterring specific activities and/ or beliefs” (Davenport 2007).”
BackgroundSchelling, T. C. (1966) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · doi:10.4324/9781315814803-17 · Cited by 1,446
Bayesian Model Averaging for Linear Regression Models
Raftery, A. E., Madigan, D., & Hoeting, J. A. (1997) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1997.10473615 · Cited by 1,287
Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State
Beissinger, M. R. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613593 · Cited by 1,161
Cited by
Hassan, M., Mattingly, D., & Nugent, E. R. (2022) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051120-013321 · Cited by 113
Fixing the Past: The Effects of Human Rights Trials on Political Attitudes in Argentina
(2025) · doi:10.1017/s0007123424000206 · Cited by 19
Metadata
- Authors
- ROZENAS, A., & ZHUKOV, Y. M.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2019-03-06
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 569-583
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2922338306
- Cited by
- 264
- References
- 54
- FWCI
- 43.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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