The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Theory of Government Failure
Abstract
This article outlines a theory of government failure that parallels the more well-established theory of market failure. It builds on the work of the public choice school concerning the behaviour of governments under the assumption that all relevant agents pursue their selfinterest. It examines the theoretical consequences for efficiency and equity of three kinds of government activity: provision, subsidy and regulation. The conclusion is reached that all three may create inefficiency and inequity, but that the form and magnitude of the failure will differ with the type of activity; hence it is important that the three are distinguished. It is also emphasised that the extent of government failure in each case (and whether it is greater or smaller than the corresponding areas of market failure) is ultimately an empirical question, not a theoretical one.
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Cites
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The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy
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Cited by
The Performance Paradox in the Public Sector
van Thiel, S., & Leeuw, F. L. (2002) · Public Performance & Management Review · doi:10.1080/15309576.2002.11643661 · Cited by 725
Governments as owners: State-owned multinational companies
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., Inkpen, A., Musacchio, A., & Ramaswamy, K. (2014) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/jibs.2014.43 · Cited by 646
Howlett, M. (2009) · Policy Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11077-009-9079-1 · Cited by 636
The Welfare State as Piggy Bank: Information, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Role of the State
Barr, N. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246599.001.0001 · Cited by 517
Challenge-Driven Innovation Policy: Towards a New Policy Toolkit
Mazzucato, M., Kattel, R., & Ryan-Collins, J. (2020) · Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade · doi:10.1007/s10842-019-00329-w · Cited by 305
Metadata
- Authors
- Le Grand, J.
- Venue
- British Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991-10
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 423-442
- ISSN
- 0007-1234 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-2112
- OpenAlex
- W2103330079
- Cited by
- 333
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 2.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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