The DOI matches its Crossref record; 55 of the 55 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government
Open accessAbstract
This article revisits the influential “Leviathan” hypothesis, which posits that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries. I use panel data to examine the effect of fiscal decentralization over time within countries, attempting to distinguish between decentralization that is funded by intergovernmental transfers and local taxation. First, I explore the logic whereby decentralization should restrict government spending if state and local governments have wide-ranging authority to set the tax base and rate, especially on mobile assets. In countries where this is most clearly the case, decentralization is associated with smaller government. Second, consistent with theoretical arguments drawn from welfare economics and positive political economy, I show that governments grow faster as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental transfers.
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Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions
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A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
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Cited by
Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives
Weingast, B. R. (2009) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jue.2008.12.005 · Cited by 710
Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability
Morrison, K. M. (2009) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818309090043 · Cited by 594
Beyond Marble Cakes and Picket Fences: What U.S. Federalism Scholars Can Learn from Comparative Work
Weissert, C. S. (2011) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381611000855 · Cited by 22
Metadata
- Authors
- Rodden, J.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 695-729
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2036000994
- Cited by
- 462
- References
- 55
- FWCI
- 108.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
