The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence
Abstract
What causes the increase in terrorism that reportedly often follows government concessions? Given this pattern, why do governments ever conciliate terrorists? I propose a model in which terrorist organizations become more militant following concessions because only moderate terrorists accept them, leaving extremists in control. Governments nonetheless are willing to make concessions because their counterterror capabilities improve because of the collusion of former terrorists. Former terrorists undertake this collusion to insure the credibility of government promises. The model also yields hypotheses regarding the level of government investment in counterterror, when moderates accept concessions, the terms of negotiated settlements, the duration of terrorist conflicts, incentives for moderate terrorists to radicalize their followers, and incentives for governments to encourage extremist challenges to moderate terrorist leaders. The model is illustrated with an application to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism
Piazza, J. A. (2011) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343310397404 · Cited by 465
The political economy of terrorism
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-5994 · Cited by 462
De Mesquita, E. B. (2005) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00139.x · Cited by 428
Self-citationAre Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate
BERREBI, C., & KLOR, E. F. (2008) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055408080246 · Cited by 410
On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Berrebi, C., & Klor, E. F. (2006) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002706293673 · Cited by 220
Metadata
- Authors
- de Mesquita, E. B.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2005-01
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 01
- Pages
- 145-176
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2060708071
- Cited by
- 209
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 42.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0020818305050022
- The paper
- de Mesquita, E. B. (2005). Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence. International Organization. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818305050022
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.