The DOI matches its Crossref record; 90 of the 90 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Assault on Civil Society: Explaining State Crackdown on NGOs
Abstract
Nongovernmental organizations are central to contemporary global governance, and their numbers and influence have grown dramatically since the middle of the twentieth century. However, in the last three decades more than 130 states have repressed these groups, suggesting that a broad range of states perceive them as costly. When they choose to repress NGOs, under what conditions do states use violent strategies versus administrative means? The choice depends on two main factors: the nature of the threat posed by these groups, and the consequences of cracking down on them. Violent crackdown is useful in the face of immediate domestic threats, such as protests. However, violence may increase the state's criminal liability, reduce its legitimacy, violate human rights treaties, and further intensify mobilization against the regime. Therefore, states are more likely to use administrative crackdown, especially in dealing with long-term threats, such as when NGOs influence electoral politics. I test this theory using an original data set of administrative crackdowns on NGOs, as well as violent crackdown on NGO activists, across all countries from 1990 to 2013. To shed light on the strategic decision between violent or administrative crackdown, and how states may perceive threats from domestic and international NGOs differently, I provide a case study from India. I conclude by discussing the implications of this crackdown for the use of civil society actors by the international community, as well as donors and citizens in the global South.
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“Similarly, operations by the Russian Wagner Group, 101 which are often linked to increases in digital repression, 102 have a negative but insignificant effect.”
From Legalizing control: the rise of restrictive internet regulation in sub-Saharan Africa (2026) · cites this paper as [102]
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Zombies ahead: Explaining the rise of low-quality election monitoring
Bush, S. S., Cottiero, C., & Prather, L. (2024) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-024-09554-3 · Cited by 33
Kalm, S., & Meeuwisse, A. (2023) · Social Politics International Studies in Gender State & Society · doi:10.1093/sp/jxad001 · Cited by 34
“They choose target scale accordingly, and adjust target when conditions change— for instance, when there is a sudden clamp-down on civil society in one place, they may focus on another (Chaudhry 2022; Glasius, Schalk, and De Lange 2020).”
Moldavanova, A. V., Onishi, T., & Toepler, S. (2023) · Public Administration and Development · doi:10.1002/pad.2005 · Cited by 23
How Regional Organizations Sustain Authoritarian Rule
Debre, M. J. (2025) · doi:10.1093/9780198903635.001.0001 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- Chaudhry, S.
- Corresponding author
- Chaudhry, Suparna
- ORCID
- Chaudhry, Suparna
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2022
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 549-590
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W4210287801
- Cited by
- 148
- References
- 90
- Citations by year
- 2026: 35 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 35 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 7
- FWCI
- 40.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Organization (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Globalization and political ideologies
- Keywords
- non-governmental organizations, civil society, state legitimacy, human rights violations, political mobilization, electoral politics, global governance, India, international donors, Global South
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