The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks
Abstract
We show that contractual risk-taking incentives for chief executive officers (CEOs) increased at large U.S. commercial banks around 2000, when industry deregulation expanded these banks’ growth opportunities. Our econometric models indicate that CEOs responded positively to these incentives, especially at the larger banks best able to take advantage of these opportunities. Our results also suggest that bank boards responded to higher-than-average levels of risk by moderating CEO risk-taking incentives; however, this feedback effect is absent at the very largest banks with strong growth opportunities and a history of highly aggressive risk-taking incentives.
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Citations
Cites
The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
CEO Compensation and Board Structure
CHHAOCHHARIA, V., & GRINSTEIN, Y. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01433.x · Cited by 611
Cited by
Erkens, D. H., Hung, M., & Matos, P. (2012) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.005 · Cited by 1,202
Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the financial crisis
DeYoung, R., & Torna, G. (2013) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2013.01.001 · Cited by 532
Self-citationCEO Narcissism, Risk-Taking, and Resilience: An Empirical Analysis in U.S. Commercial Banks
Buyl, T., Boone, C., & Wade, J. B. (2019) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206317699521 · Cited by 367
Does local religiosity matter for bank risk-taking?
Adhikari, B. K., & Agrawal, A. (2016) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.009 · Cited by 266
Classification and Measurement under IFRS 9: A Commentary and Suggestions for Future Research
Kvaal, E., Löw, E., Novotny-Farkas, Z., Panaretou, A., Renders, A., & Sampers, P. (2024) · Accounting in Europe · doi:10.1080/17449480.2023.2253808 · Cited by 28
Metadata
- Authors
- DeYoung, R., Peng, E. Y., & Yan, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2013-01-08
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 165-196
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-6916
- OpenAlex
- W3124796296
- Cited by
- 314
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 123.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- DeYoung, R., Peng, E. Y., & Yan, M. (2013). Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109012000646
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
