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Knowing the Supreme Court? A Reconsideration of Public Ignorance of the High Court
Abstract
Conventional wisdom holds that the American people are woefully ignorant about law and courts. In light of this putative ignorance, scholars and other commentators have questioned whether the public should play a role in the judicial process—for example, whether public preferences should matter for U.S. Supreme Court confirmation processes. Unfortunately, however, much of what we know—or think we know— about public knowledge of the Supreme Court is based upon flawed measures and procedures. So, for instance, the American National Election Study, a prominent source of the conclusion that people know little if anything about the U.S. Supreme Court, codes as incorrect the reply that William Rehnquist is (was) a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court; respondents, to be judged knowledgeable, must identify Rehnquist as the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (which, of course, technically, he was not). More generally, the use of open-ended recall questions leads to a serious and substantial underestimation of the extent to which ordinary people know about the nation's highest court. Our purpose in this paper is to revisit the question of how knowledgeable the American people are about the Supreme Court. Based on two national surveys— using more appropriate, closed-ended questions—we demonstrate that levels of knowledge about the Court and its justices are far higher than nearly all earlier surveys have documented. And, based on an experiment embedded in one of the national surveys, we also show the dramatic effect of question-form on estimates of levels of knowledge. Finally, we draw out the implications of political knowledge for the degree to which people support the U.S. Supreme Court. Our findings indicate that greater knowledge of the Court is associated with stronger loyalty toward the institution. We conclude by reconnecting these findings to “positivity theory,” which asserts that paying attention to courts not only provides citizens information, but also exposes them to powerful symbols of judicial legitimacy.
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Citations
Cited by
Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science
(2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511921452 · Cited by 611
On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American Public
Bartels, B. L., & Johnston, C. D. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00616.x · Cited by 349
The Question(s) of Political Knowledge
BARABAS, J., JERIT, J., POLLOCK, W., & RAINEY, C. (2014) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000392 · Cited by 333
How Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court
Casillas, C. J., Enns, P. K., & Wohlfarth, P. C. (2011) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00485.x · Cited by 281
The consequences of political innumeracy
Lawrence, E. D., & Sides, J. (2014) · Research & Politics · doi:10.1177/2053168014545414 · Cited by 130
“Although scholars debate the extent of the public’s factual knowledge of politics (e.g. Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Gibson and Caldeira, 2009; Lupia, 2006; Luskin and Bullock, 2011; Prior and Lupia, 2008), certainly a large proportion of the public does not know many different political facts,…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Gibson, J. L., & Caldeira, G. A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2009-04
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 429-441
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2151828779
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 117.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Gibson, J. L., & Caldeira, G. A. (2009). Knowing the Supreme Court? A Reconsideration of Public Ignorance of the High Court. The Journal of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381609090379
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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