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Self-Evidence And Proof
Open accessAbstract
There is an argument, well known in the history of philosophy, which makes all knowledge ultimately depend on some kind of intuitive or sensory immediacy. According to this argument, either the proposition itself is self–evident;2 or else it can be shown to follow, with the help of a chain of intermediate links, from other propositions which are self–evident. Moreover, it is this self–evidence of immediate knowledge and only this which, again speaking traditionally, sufficiently guarantees the truth of the affirmations of a science as opposed to those of various and fluctuating opinions.
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Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Perelman, 1952, Rhétorique et Philosophie
- Ayer, 1956, The Problem of Knowledge, 34
- Perelman, 1958, Traité de l'argumentation
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Metadata
- Authors
- Perelman, C. H.
- Venue
- Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1958-10
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 127
- Pages
- 289-302
- ISSN
- 0031-8191 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-817X
- OpenAlex
- W2121561713
- Cited by
- 340
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Self-Evidence And Proof. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0031819100054991
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- Perelman, C. H. (1958). Self-Evidence And Proof. Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100054991
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
