Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 22 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Belief and religious ‘belief’

Open access
AHMED, ARIF · 2020 · Religious Studies

Abstract

Is the analysis of religion best conducted in terms of the beliefs of its practitioners? I describe a Wittgenstein-inspired approach to belief on which it is dubious that religious practices satisfy the criteria for the attribution of belief. I defend this more moderate and plausible version of Needham's thesis against two natural reasons to think religious belief widespread.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper defends a moderate Wittgenstein-inspired version of Needham’s thesis: it is doubtful that all or most religious practitioners believe the religious propositions they avow. It argues that belief attributions depend on defeasible behavioural criteria—evidentialism and penetration—and that religious avowals and explanatory appeals do not establish widespread religious belief.

Key findings

  • The author grants Needham’s premise that the concept of belief picks out no single feature but rejects Needham’s conclusion that we should discard it, arguing that borderline or contested concepts can still be legitimate.
  • He proposes two criteria for belief: evidentialism, on which belief is sensitive to evidence, and penetration, on which a belief must penetrate the whole range of one’s behaviour. He suggests much religious engagement fails these criteria, so many religious assertions may not express belief.
  • He reinterprets the evidence for religious belief: first-person avowals are “transparent” and based on evidence for the proposition itself, not privileged inner observation; and belief explanations only “point to” where an explanation lies rather than explaining behaviour.
  • He cites survey evidence of widespread self-reported belief, including 2018 Pew data that 80% of Americans claiming to be Christian believed in the God of the Bible, 99% believed in “a higher power of some kind,” and 89% of Jewish respondents did so; 2012 Pew data that 98% of surveyed Muslims in Southeast Asia believed in angels, 96% in Heaven, and 60% in South Asia in the imminent return of the Mahdi; and data that 67% of Asian-American Buddhists and 34% of Asian-American Hindus professed belief in ancestral spirits, while 64% and 59% respectively professed belief in reincarnation.

Methods

  • Philosophical/conceptual paper; no new empirical study. It develops a Wittgenstein-inspired account of belief by contrasting the Tractatus’s inner-picture view with the later family-resemblance and criteria-based view in Philosophical Investigations.
  • Uses textual analysis of Wittgenstein and secondary philosophical sources (Needham, Smith, Crane, Evans, and others) plus illustrative examples such as the Rain-King, a Politburo official, a pupil learning to read, and a disappearing chair.
  • Main analysis distinguishes evidentialism and penetration, then applies them to religious assertions and behaviour, concluding that whether religious people believe religious propositions is an open empirical question requiring cross-cultural investigation.

Limitations

  • Stated: the author does not offer conclusive grounds for thinking all or most followers of all or most religions lack religious beliefs; settling the question would require a cross-cultural empirical investigation beyond the space available, and no single answer should be expected across all traditions.
  • Stated: the aim is only to sketch how things might look and to suggest doubt about the contrary claim, not to prove that religious belief is much less widespread than religion itself.
  • Evident: the paper presents no original empirical data or systematic cross-cultural sample; it relies on illustrative examples and cited surveys, and its proposed criteria are defeasible and may admit borderline cases, as the author acknowledges.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/s0034412519000234

Cites

37 of 37 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 Valid · 5 Not valid · 22 Not checked · 52 Own results and interpretations

32 more claims

Create a free account to see all 79 claims and every source verdict.

See all claims — free account
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 34
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 10

Create a free account to see these claims.

Citations

Cites

Show all 38 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Wittgenstein, 1993, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912–51, 115

Cited by

See all 5

Metadata

Authors
AHMED, A.
Affiliations
University of Cambridge (GB)
Corresponding author
AHMED, ARIF
Venue
Religious Studies
Published
2019-05-06
Volume
56
Issue
1
Pages
80-94
ISSN
  • 0034-4125 (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-901X
OpenAlex
W2944697443
Cited by
5
References
38
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3
FWCI
4.57
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Religious Studies (publishedVersion)
  • Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion)
  • Apollo
Funders
Leverhulme Trust (RF-2018-231\10)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Study and Philosophy of Religion
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
religious beliefs, belief attribution, Wittgenstein, religious practice, philosophy of religion, epistemology of religion

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-21, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).

A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-21 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Belief and religious ‘belief’. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0034412519000234
The paper
AHMED, A. (2020). Belief and religious ‘belief’. Religious Studies. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412519000234

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.