The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 22 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
Belief and religious ‘belief’
Open accessAbstract
Is the analysis of religion best conducted in terms of the beliefs of its practitioners? I describe a Wittgenstein-inspired approach to belief on which it is dubious that religious practices satisfy the criteria for the attribution of belief. I defend this more moderate and plausible version of Needham's thesis against two natural reasons to think religious belief widespread.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper defends a moderate Wittgenstein-inspired version of Needham’s thesis: it is doubtful that all or most religious practitioners believe the religious propositions they avow. It argues that belief attributions depend on defeasible behavioural criteria—evidentialism and penetration—and that religious avowals and explanatory appeals do not establish widespread religious belief.
Key findings
- The author grants Needham’s premise that the concept of belief picks out no single feature but rejects Needham’s conclusion that we should discard it, arguing that borderline or contested concepts can still be legitimate.
- He proposes two criteria for belief: evidentialism, on which belief is sensitive to evidence, and penetration, on which a belief must penetrate the whole range of one’s behaviour. He suggests much religious engagement fails these criteria, so many religious assertions may not express belief.
- He reinterprets the evidence for religious belief: first-person avowals are “transparent” and based on evidence for the proposition itself, not privileged inner observation; and belief explanations only “point to” where an explanation lies rather than explaining behaviour.
- He cites survey evidence of widespread self-reported belief, including 2018 Pew data that 80% of Americans claiming to be Christian believed in the God of the Bible, 99% believed in “a higher power of some kind,” and 89% of Jewish respondents did so; 2012 Pew data that 98% of surveyed Muslims in Southeast Asia believed in angels, 96% in Heaven, and 60% in South Asia in the imminent return of the Mahdi; and data that 67% of Asian-American Buddhists and 34% of Asian-American Hindus professed belief in ancestral spirits, while 64% and 59% respectively professed belief in reincarnation.
Methods
- Philosophical/conceptual paper; no new empirical study. It develops a Wittgenstein-inspired account of belief by contrasting the Tractatus’s inner-picture view with the later family-resemblance and criteria-based view in Philosophical Investigations.
- Uses textual analysis of Wittgenstein and secondary philosophical sources (Needham, Smith, Crane, Evans, and others) plus illustrative examples such as the Rain-King, a Politburo official, a pupil learning to read, and a disappearing chair.
- Main analysis distinguishes evidentialism and penetration, then applies them to religious assertions and behaviour, concluding that whether religious people believe religious propositions is an open empirical question requiring cross-cultural investigation.
Limitations
- Stated: the author does not offer conclusive grounds for thinking all or most followers of all or most religions lack religious beliefs; settling the question would require a cross-cultural empirical investigation beyond the space available, and no single answer should be expected across all traditions.
- Stated: the aim is only to sketch how things might look and to suggest doubt about the contrary claim, not to prove that religious belief is much less widespread than religion itself.
- Evident: the paper presents no original empirical data or systematic cross-cultural sample; it relies on illustrative examples and cited surveys, and its proposed criteria are defeasible and may admit borderline cases, as the author acknowledges.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 5 Not valid · 22 Not checked · 52 Own results and interpretations
In the paper
“It isn ' t too fanciful to suspect that many modern Jews, Christians, and Muslims exhibit a similar sort of disconnection between what they do and feel and what we should expect them to do and feel if they really believed what they profess.”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Wittgenstein ( 1993 )
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“First: this attitude is prima facie grounds for denying that the subject ' s attitude is doxastic.”
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The indeterminacy, over whether it was really a chair or whether the pupil was reading that fi rst time, also arises for belief.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A statement the paper makes itself — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“But in the absence of special reasons to conceal the belief that p , overt behaviour that it rationalizes is criterial for the attribution of it.”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“On this point, probably much religious engagement is not sensitive to evidence in the way you would expect if it were expression of belief.”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Crane ( 2017 ) source
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
32 more claims
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 34
- It may state two separate claims as one. 10
Citations
Cites
(1960) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 5,851
(2009) · Philosophical Investigations · doi:10.1111/(issn)1467-9205 · Cited by 2,366
Evans, G., & McDowell, J. (1982) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 2,360
IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts
Gallie, W. B. (1956) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society · doi:10.1093/aristotelian/56.1.167 · Cited by 2,280
Essentially Contested Concepts
Gallie, W. B., & Philosophy Documentation Center (1994) · Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines · doi:10.5840/inquiryctnews19941415 · Cited by 1,851
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.
Peacocke, C., & Kripke, S. A. (1984) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184586 · Cited by 1,427
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.
Loar, B., & Kripke, S. (1985) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2214934 · Cited by 1,274
(2014) · Wittgenstein · doi:10.4324/9781315823232-5 · Cited by 1,268
A theory of content and other essays
(1991) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-5027 · Cited by 1,178
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology.
Diamond, C., Wittgenstein, L., Anscombe, G. E. M., von Wright, G. H., Nyman, H., Luckhardt, C. G., & Aue, M. A. E. (1984) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184551 · Cited by 878
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Wittgenstein, 1993, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912–51, 115
Cited by
Ethics of Belief in Paranormal Phenomena
Irwin, H. J., Dagnall, N., & Drinkwater, K. G. (2022) · Journal of Anomalous Experience and Cognition · doi:10.31156/jaex.23514 · Cited by 3
Qodir, Z. (2021) · Epistemé Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman · doi:10.21274/epis.2021.16.02.105-129 · Cited by 1
Lougheed, K., & Hendricks, P. (2021) · doi:10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0421
Qodir, Z. (2021) · Epistemé Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman · doi:10.21274/epis.2021.16.02.127-151
Metadata
- Authors
- AHMED, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Cambridge (GB)
- Corresponding author
- AHMED, ARIF
- ORCID
- AHMED, ARIF
- Venue
- Religious Studies
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2019-05-06
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 80-94
- ISSN
- 0034-4125 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-901X
- OpenAlex
- W2944697443
- Cited by
- 5
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3
- FWCI
- 4.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Religious Studies (publishedVersion)
- Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion)
- Apollo
- Funders
- Leverhulme Trust (RF-2018-231\10)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Study and Philosophy of Religion
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- religious beliefs, belief attribution, Wittgenstein, religious practice, philosophy of religion, epistemology of religion
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- AHMED, A. (2020). Belief and religious ‘belief’. Religious Studies. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412519000234
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.