WHAT IS A POLITICAL VALUE? POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND FIDELITY TO REALITY
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This essay seeks to defend the claim that political philosophy ought to be appropriately guided by the phenomenon of politics that it seeks to both offer a theory of and, especially in its normative guise, offer a theory for. It does this primarily through the question of political values. It begins by arguing that for any value to qualify as a value for the political domain, it must be intelligible in relation to the constitutive features of politics as a human activity. It then examines the extent to which the preconditions for the realization of values in practice ought to figure in our considerations as to whether they are values that fit or belong to our social world. We can understand these parts of the essay as responding to two related questions, respectively: (i) Is this a political value at all? — which is to ask, is it a value that is appropriate for the political realm?; and then (ii) Is this a political value for us? The final section responds to the often-made complaint that political philosophy ought not to make any concessions to the actual world of politics as it really is, arguing that attending to the realities of politics, and in particular the constitutive conditions of political activity, gives meaning to the enterprise as the theorization of politics (and not something else). Furthermore those same conditions provide the limits of intelligibility beyond which ideals and values can no longer be, in any meaningful sense, ideals and values for the political sphere.
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Citations
Cites
A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition
Rawls, J. (1999) · doi:10.4159/9780674042582 · Cited by 9,455
Legitimacy in Realist Thought: Between Moralism and Realpolitik
Sleat, M. (2014) · Political Theory · doi:10.1177/0090591714522250 · Cited by 119
Self-citation
Cited by
Political normativity and the functional autonomy of politics
Burelli, C. (2022) · European Journal of Political Theory · doi:10.1177/1474885120918500 · Cited by 42
A realistic conception of politics: conflict, order and political realism
Burelli, C. (2021) · Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy · doi:10.1080/13698230.2019.1604045 · Cited by 24
Taking rulers' interests seriously: The case for realist theories of legitimacy
Cross, B. (2024) · European Journal of Political Theory · doi:10.1177/14748851221114302 · Cited by 11
“Second, realists have argued that moralist theories of legitimacy are excessively abstract, ahistorical and a priori (Sleat 2016, Hall 2017).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Sleat, M.
- Venue
- Social Philosophy and Policy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2016
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 252-272
- ISSN
- 0265-0525 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-6437
- OpenAlex
- W2407408949
- Cited by
- 62
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 11.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Sleat, M. (2016). WHAT IS A POLITICAL VALUE? POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND FIDELITY TO REALITY. Social Philosophy and Policy. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0265052516000285
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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