Cited by 224Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryGame Theory and Voting Systems

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Team preferences.

Sugden, Robert·2000·Economics and Philosophy

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Abstract

When my family discusses how we should spend a summer holiday, we start from certain common understandings about our preferences. We prefer self-catering accommodation to hotels, and hotels to campsites. We prefer walking and looking at scenery and wildlife to big-city sightseeing and shopping. When it comes to walks, we prefer walks of six miles or so to ones which are much shorter or much longer, and prefer well-marked but uncrowded paths to ones which are either more rugged or more popular. And so on. These common understandings greatly simplify the task of choosing between holiday destinations and activities, by allowing us quickly to eliminate many options. But what does it mean to say that we prefer one thing to another?

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Social Evolution
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Authors: Sugden, R.
Affiliations: University of East Anglia (GB)
Corresponding author: Sugden, Robert
ORCID: Sugden, Robert
Venue: Economics and Philosophy
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published: 2000-10
Volume: 16
Issue: 2
Pages: 175-204
ISSN: 0266-2671 (ISSN-L)
1474-0028
DOI: 10.1017/s0266267100000213
OpenAlex: W4239546423
Cited by: 224
References: 0
Citations by year: 2026: 21 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 16
FWCI: 2.93
Type: journal article
Language: en
Open access: closed
Licence: www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 39 d)
Locations: Economics and Philosophy (publishedVersion)
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics: Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords: preference aggregation, group decision making, decision making under uncertainty

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Integrity signals

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