Keynesian Uncertainty and the Weight of Arguments
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In Chapter 12 of the General Theory, on “The State of Long-Term Expectation,” Keynes writes: “It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain” (CW VII, p. 148). In a footnote to this sentence, Keynes points out that by “very uncertain” he does not mean the same as “very improbable” and refers to the chapter on “The Weight of Arguments” in his earlier Treatise on Probability (CW VIII, pp. 77–85). The purpose of this article, in the first place, is to provide an account of, and to sort out the relations between, Keynes's views on probability, uncertainty, and the weight of arguments.
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Cited by
Justifying precautionary policies: Incommensurability and uncertainty
Aldred, J. (2013) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.10.006 · Cited by 36
Metadata
- Authors
- Runde, J.
- Venue
- Economics and Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1990-10
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 275-292
- ISSN
- 0266-2671 (ISSN-L)
- 1474-0028
- OpenAlex
- W2034031234
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 32.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Runde, J. (1990). Keynesian Uncertainty and the Weight of Arguments. Economics and Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100001255
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.