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Cited by 58Philosophical Ethics and TheoryPolitical Philosophy and EthicsGame Theory and Voting Systems

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Collective preferences, obligations, and rational choice.

Gilbert, Margaret·2001·Economics and Philosophy
DOI 10.1017/s0266267101000177
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Abstract

Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in some way reducible to the personal preferences of their members? In short, are collective preferences possible? In everyday life people speak easily of what we prefer, where what is at issue seems to be a collective preference. This is suggested by the acceptability of such remarks as ‘My ideal walk would be . . . along rougher and less well-marked paths than we prefer as a family’. One can imagine, indeed, that each member of a given family prefers something other than what the family prefers. What, then, do the collective preferences of everyday understanding amount to?

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Metadata

Authors
Gilbert, M.
Affiliations
University of Connecticut (US)
Corresponding author
Gilbert, Margaret
ORCID
Gilbert, Margaret
Venue
Economics and Philosophy
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2001-04
Volume
17
Issue
1
Pages
109-119
ISSN
  • 0266-2671 (ISSN-L)
  • 1474-0028
DOI
10.1017/s0266267101000177
OpenAlex
W3125087393
Cited by
58
References
9
Citations by year
2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 5
FWCI
19.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 46 d)
Locations
Economics and Philosophy (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords
group preferences, collective choice, rational choice, obligation, teams, collectivity, individual preferences, family preferences, preference aggregation

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