Income, Preferences, and the Dynamics of Policy Responsiveness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A variety of measures indicate that income inequality has grown significantly in the United States during the last three decades (APSA 2004; Brandolini and Smeeding 2006). In a flurry of recent research, scholars have attributed this trend to the failure of the national government to represent the preferences of ordinary citizens in general and less wealthy citizens in particular (APSA 2004; Bartels 2004; 2006; Gilens 2005), who participate in politics less consistently and contribute fewer resources to political candidates than their wealthier peers (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The American Political Science Association's (APSA) Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy summarizes this representative failure hypothesis: “disparities in participation ensure that ordinary Americans speak in a whisper while the most advantaged roar” (2004, 2).
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Citations
Cites
Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics
VERBA, S., SCHLOZMAN, K. L., & BRADY, H. E. (1995) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv1pnc1k7 · Cited by 6,626
Voice and equality: civic voluntarism in American politics
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Congress, The Electoral Connection
Ross, M. J., & Mayhew, D. R. (1975) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447379 · Cited by 4,094
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Hibbs, D. A. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400269712 · Cited by 3,368
Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew
Page, B. I. (1975) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2148248 · Cited by 3,130
Legislative leviathan: party government in the House
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-0579 · Cited by 2,313
Effects of Public Opinion on Policy
Page, B. I., & Shapiro, R. Y. (1983) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956018 · Cited by 1,778 · cited 1×
“This line of research suggests that policymaking is broadly democratic and that, at least in general terms, elected officials take account of the mass public’s preferences when making policy ~e.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Page and Shapiro 1983; Wlezien 1996!.”
BackgroundParties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Rohde, D. W. (1991) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226724058.001.0001 · Cited by 1,395
Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality
Gottschalk, P. T., & Smeeding, T. M. (1997) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,224
The public as thermostat: dynamics of preferences for spending
Wlezien, C. (1995) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111666 · Cited by 1,154 · cited 1×
“A growing body of research suggests that the process through which preferences are represented is dynamic—that is, changes in public preferences produce future changes in policy outputs ~Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Wlezien 1995; 1996!.”
Background
Cited by
Cointegration Testing and Dynamic Simulations of Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models
Jordan, S., & Philips, A. Q. (2018) · The Stata Journal: Promoting communications on statistics and Stata · doi:10.1177/1536867x1801800409 · Cited by 538
Kelly, N. J., & Enns, P. K. (2010) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00472.x · Cited by 368
Selective responsiveness: Online public demands and government responsiveness in authoritarian China
Su, Z., & Meng, T. (2016) · Social Science Research · doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2016.04.017 · Cited by 202
“This is mainly because the less wealthy citizens, compared to their richer peers, participate in politics less consistently and contribute fewer resources to political candidates (Ura and Ellis, 2008; Verba et al., 1995).”
BackgroundTHE POOR POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Giger, N., Rosset, J., & Bernauer, J. (2012) · Representation · doi:10.1080/00344893.2012.653238 · Cited by 187
Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American States
Flavin, P. (2012) · American Politics Research · doi:10.1177/1532673x11416920 · Cited by 162
“They conclude that because political opinions do not significantly differ, “it may be simply impossible for elected officials to perceive and react differently to the ‘scope of government’ preferences of different income groups” (Ura & Ellis, 2008, p. 791).”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Ura, J. D., & Ellis, C. R.
- Venue
- PS: Political Science & Politics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2008-10
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 785-794
- ISSN
- 0030-8269 (ISSN-L)
- 1049-0965
- 1537-5935
- OpenAlex
- W2142949650
- Cited by
- 177
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 40.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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