Are Financial or Moral Scandals Worse? It Depends.
The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
Previous analysis finds that people respond differently to “financial” (e.g., tax evasion) and “moral” (e.g., sexual misconduct) political scandals. However, experimental and observational studies tend to reach different conclusions about which type of scandal induces a stronger negative reaction from the public. We use an experiment embedded in a national survey to examine the possibility that these divergent findings can, in part, be explained by a failure to consider the effects of abuses of power. Consistent with previous experimental work, we find that people respond more negatively to financial scandals than to moral scandals when they do not involve abuses of power. However, abuses of power substantially affect responses to both types of scandals. We also find that moral and financial scandals affect personal and job evaluations of a politician differently. These findings support our contention that to understand public responses to scandal, it is crucial to consider the relationship between the scandalous behavior and the official's formal responsibilities.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“At the same time, however, people are also willing to support members of their party even when they evaluate them negatively (Doherty et al., 2011;Funck & McCabe, 2022;Goren, 2002)-consistent with the idea that partisans are motivated to help their party to win, over and above any motivation to downplay its moral shortcomings.”
From On the Defensive: Identity, Language, and Partisan Reactions to Political Scandal (2025) · cites this paper as Doherty et al., 2011
In the citing paper
“Scandals consistently damage partisans' attitudes toward and willingness to support their party's leaders (Doherty et al., 2011;Funck & McCabe, 2022;Rottinghaus, 2023).”
From On the Defensive: Identity, Language, and Partisan Reactions to Political Scandal (2025) · cites this paper as Doherty et al., 2011
In the citing paper
“All three scandals illegally exploited the politician's power; previous work suggests that abuse-of-power scandals are perceived more negatively than scandals that could be seen as orthogonal to a politician's job (Doherty et al., 2011).”
From On the Defensive: Identity, Language, and Partisan Reactions to Political Scandal (2025) · cites this paper as Doherty et al., 2011
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
No references could be resolved yet.
Research works printed but not linked: 14
- Brown, 2006, Revisiting the Character of Congressional Scandals in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1966–2002, Journal of Political Marketing, 5, 149, 10.1300/J199v05n01_08 · doi:10.1300/j199v05n01_08
- Ansolabehere, Stephen . 2010. Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2009: COMMON CONTENT. [Computer File] Release 2: March 2, 2010. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Intitute of Technology [producer].
- Bishin, 2006, Character Counts? Honesty and Fairness in Election 2000, Public Opinion Quarterly, 70, 235, 10.1093/poq/nfj016 · DOI
- Brown, Lara M. 2007. “It's Good to Be an Incumbent: Scandals, Corruption, and the 2006 Midterm Election.” Extension of Remarks, APSA Legislative Studies' Section Newsletter, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January).
- Puglisi, Riccardo , and Snyder, James M. Jr. 2008. “Media Coverage of Political Scandals.” Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Typescript. · DOI
- Carlson, 2000, Scandal and Political Candidate Image, Southeastern Political Review, 28, 747, 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2000.tb00798.x · DOI
- Groseclose, 1994, Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks, and Strategic Retirements from the 102nd House, American Journal of Political Science, 38, 75, 10.2307/2111336 · DOI · Paper page
- Welch, 1997, The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections, 1982–1990, Journal of Politics, 59, 226, 10.2307/2998224 · DOI
- Peters, 1980, The Effects of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections, American Political Science Review, 74, 697, 10.2307/1958151 · DOI · Paper page
- Abramowitz, 1988, Explaining Senate Election Outcomes, American Political Science Review, 82, 385, 10.2307/1957392 · DOI · Paper page
- Bowler, 2004, Politicians, Scandals, and Trust in Government, Political Behavior, 26, 271, 10.1023/B:POBE.0000043456.87303.3a · DOI · Paper page
- Jacobson, 1994, Checking Out: The Effects of Bank Overdrafts on the 1992 House Elections, American Journal of Political Science, 38, 601, 10.2307/2111599 · DOI
- Funk, 1996, The Impact of Scandal on Candidate Evaluations: An Experimental Test of the Role of Candidate Traits, Political Behavior, 18, 1, 10.1007/BF01498658 · DOI · Paper page
- Abramowitz, 1991, Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections, Journal of Politics, 53, 34, 10.2307/2131719 · DOI · Paper page
Cited by
Voters’ Partisan Responses to Politicians’ Immoral Behavior
Walter, A. S., & Redlawsk, D. P. (2019) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12582 · Cited by 58
On the Defensive: Identity, Language, and Partisan Reactions to Political Scandal
Ekstrom, P. D., Gonzales, M. H., Williams, A. L., Weiner, E., & Aguilera, R. (2025) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/01461672241247084 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Doherty, D., Dowling, C. M., & Miller, M. G.
- Venue
- PS: Political Science & Politics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2011-10
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 749-757
- ISSN
- 1049-0965
- 1537-5935
- Cited by
- 69
- References
- 0
- Language
- en
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.