It Must be True – But How Can it Be? Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Mental Composition
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Although panpsychism has had a very long history, one that goes back to the very origin of western philosophy, its force has only recently been appreciated by analytic philosophers of mind. And even if many still reject the theory as utterly absurd, others have argued that it is the only genuine form of physicalism. This paper examines the case for panpsychism and argues that there are at least good prima facie reasons for taking it seriously. In a second step, the paper discusses the main difficulty the theory has to face, the ‘composition problem’. This is the problem of explaining how the primitive experiences that are supposed to exist at the ultimate level of reality could give rise to the unified experience of a human being. What assumptions as to the nature of experience generate the composition problem? Is mental composition impossible in principle or do we simply lack at present any understanding of phenomenal parts and wholes?
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Cites
Can We Solve the Mind–Body Problem?
MCGINN, C. (1989) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/xcviii.391.349 · Cited by 745
Skrbina, D. (2017) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/11084.001.0001 · Cited by 279
Mind that Abides: Panpsychism in the new millennium
(2009) · Advances in Consciousness Research · doi:10.1075/aicr.75 · Cited by 80
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Cited by
The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
Chalmers, D. J. (2016) · Panpsychism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0008 · Cited by 231
Beyond Combination: How Cosmic Consciousness Grounds Ordinary Experience
SHANI, I., & KEPPLER, J. (2018) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2018.30 · Cited by 91
Cosmopsychism, Coherence, and World-Affirming Monism
Shani, I. (2022) · The Monist · doi:10.1093/monist/onab020 · Cited by 23
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness
Mørch, H. H. (2024) · doi:10.1017/9781009317344 · Cited by 18
Metadata
- Authors
- Basile, P.
- Venue
- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2010-07-07
- Volume
- 67
- Pages
- 93-112
- ISSN
- 1358-2461 (ISSN-L)
- 1755-3555
- OpenAlex
- W2140546405
- Cited by
- 33
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 0.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Basile, P. (2010). It Must be True – But How Can it Be? Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Mental Composition. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1358246110000044
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