CoChat

It Must be True – But How Can it Be? Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Mental Composition

Open access
Basile, Pierfrancesco · 2010 · Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
Cited by 33

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Although panpsychism has had a very long history, one that goes back to the very origin of western philosophy, its force has only recently been appreciated by analytic philosophers of mind. And even if many still reject the theory as utterly absurd, others have argued that it is the only genuine form of physicalism. This paper examines the case for panpsychism and argues that there are at least good prima facie reasons for taking it seriously. In a second step, the paper discusses the main difficulty the theory has to face, the ‘composition problem’. This is the problem of explaining how the primitive experiences that are supposed to exist at the ultimate level of reality could give rise to the unified experience of a human being. What assumptions as to the nature of experience generate the composition problem? Is mental composition impossible in principle or do we simply lack at present any understanding of phenomenal parts and wholes?

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/s1358246110000044

Cites

3 of 3 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 3 references

Research works printed but not linked: 21

  1. Spinoza, 1994, Ethics
  2. James, 1909, A Pluralistic Universe: Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College on the Present Situation in Philosophy, 192
  3. Wittgenstein, 1953, Philosophical Investigations
  4. Strawson, 2006, Consciousness and its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?, 12
  5. Ward, 1927, Essays in Philosophy: with a Memoir by Olwen Ward Campell, 247
  6. Chalmers, 1996, The Conscious Mind, 293
  7. McGinn, 1991, The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution
  8. Nagel, 1979, Mortal Questions, 194
  9. Sprigge, 1983, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism, 128
  10. Whitehead, 1978, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, 83
  11. James, 1950, The Principles of Psychology, I, 146
  12. Dainton, 2000, Stream of Consciousness. Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience, 181
  13. Russell, 1948, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, 240
  14. Searle, 2004, Mind: A Brief Introduction, 149, 10.1093/oso/9780195157338.001.0001 · DOI · Paper page
  15. Hume, 2000, A Treatise of Human Nature, 137
  16. Clayton, 2004, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness, vi, 10.1093/oso/9780199272525.001.0001 · DOI
  17. Ross, 2007, Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, 18
  18. Leibniz, 1898, The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings, 370, 10.5962/bhl.title.27631 · DOI
  19. Dewey, 1958, Experience and Nature
  20. Nagel, 1986, The View from Nowhere, 52
  21. Skrbina, 2009, Transcending Consciousness: Thoughts on a Universal Conception of Mind, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16, 81

Cited by

See all 33

Metadata

Authors
Basile, P.
Venue
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
Published
2010-07-07
Volume
67
Pages
93-112
ISSN
  • 1358-2461 (ISSN-L)
  • 1755-3555
OpenAlex
W2140546405
Cited by
33
References
3
FWCI
0.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: It Must be True – But How Can it Be? Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Mental Composition. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s1358246110000044
The paper
Basile, P. (2010). It Must be True – But How Can it Be? Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Mental Composition. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1358246110000044

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.