Cited by 760Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEmotions and Moral BehaviorMental Health and Psychiatry

Consciousness and the varieties of emotion experience: A theoretical framework.

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Lambie, John A., Marcel, Anthony J.·2002·Psychological Review

Abstract

Data reviewed suggest that previous theories of emotion experience are too narrow in scope and that lack of consensus is due to the fact that emotion experience takes various forms and is heterogenous. The authors treat separately the content of emotion experience, the underlying nonconscious correspondences, and processes producing emotion experience. They classify the nature and content of emotion experience and propose that it depends on 3 aspects of attention: mode (analytic-synthetic; detached-immersed), direction (self-world), and focus (evaluation-action). The account is informed by a 2-level view of consciousness in which phenomenology (1st order) is distinguished from awareness (2nd order). These distinctions enable the authors to differentiate and account for cases of "unconscious" emotion, in which there is an apparent lack of phenomenology or awareness.

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Crossref · 10.1037/0033-295x.109.2.219

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  • Appraisal processes largely proceed automatically and non-consciously.

    “Appraisal processes largely proceed automatically and non-consciously (Lambie and Marcel, 2002).”

    From Impulsive action: emotional impulses and their control (2014) · cites this paper as Lambie and Marcel, 2002

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References 195 · Cited by 760

Authors
Lambie, J. A., & Marcel, A. J.
Affiliations
  • University of Cambridge (GB)
  • MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit (GB)
Venue
Psychological Review
Published
2002
Volume
109
Issue
2
Pages
219-259
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
OpenAlex
W2158885936
Cited by
760
References
195
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 42 · 2021: 34 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 110 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 39 · 2015: 25 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 27
FWCI
28.32
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by-nc-nd
Locations
  • Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Anglia Ruskin Research Online (Anglia Ruskin University) (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
emotional experience, consciousness, attention, phenomenology, awareness, unconscious emotions, unconscious processes
MeSH terms
Consciousness, Emotions, Humans, Models, Psychological, Perception

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