Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 171

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Judgmental model of the Ebbinghaus illusion.

Massaro, Dominic W., Anderson, Norman H.·1971·Journal of Experimental Psychology

Abstract

Two experiments studied the Ebbinghaus illusion as a function of four stimulus variables: the size of the context circles, the number of context circles, the distance between the context circles and the center circle, and the size of the center circle. The results provided a quantitative test of a judgmental model that considers the Ebbinghaus illusion to be comparative in nature. The context circles, then, serve as standards or yardsticks, and the center circle is judged partly relative to them. The model provided a reasonably good description of the magnitude of the illusion as a function of the several stimulus variables. The center circle in Fig. 1 appears larger when surrounded by small circles, smaller when surrounded by large circles. This figure, known as the Ebbinghaus illusion, or Titchener circles, has seen relatively little systematic study. The present article reports two parametric studies done within a judgmental theory of stimulus integration (Anderson, 1970a, 1970b; Massaro &

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/h0031158

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 1 references

Cited by

See all 171

Metadata

Authors
Massaro, D. W., & Anderson, N. H.
Venue
Journal of Experimental Psychology
Published
1971
Volume
89
Issue
1
Pages
147-151
ISSN
0022-1015 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2149217077
Cited by
171
References
1
FWCI
4.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Judgmental model of the Ebbinghaus illusion. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037/h0031158
The paper
Massaro, D. W., & Anderson, N. H. (1971). Judgmental model of the Ebbinghaus illusion. Journal of Experimental Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0031158

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.