The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions.
Abstract
30 pages
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Citations
Cites
Intransitivity of preferences.
Tversky, A. (1969) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0026750 · Cited by 2,188
Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty.
Klevorick, A. K., & Raiffa, H. (1969) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2325714 · Cited by 1,928
Measuring Utility by a Single-Response Sequential Method (1964)
Becker, G. M., & DeGroot, M. H. (1974) · Economic Information, Decision, and Prediction · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-9276-0_16 · Cited by 1,540
Relative importance of probabilities and payoffs in risk taking.
Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1968) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0026468 · Cited by 562
Self-citationThe prediction of decisions among bets.
Edwards, W. (1955) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0041692 · Cited by 288
Inconsistent preferences among gambles.
Lindman, H. R. (1971) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0031208 · Cited by 256
Utility theory and additivity analysis of risky choices.
Tversky, A. (1967) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0024915 · Cited by 144
Testing expectation theories of decision making without measuring utility or subjective probability
Coombs, C. H., Bezembinder, T. G. G., & Goode, F. M. (1967) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/0022-2496(67)90042-9 · Cited by 66
Cited by
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232669 · Cited by 4,042
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Metadata
- Authors
- Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology
- Published
- 1971-07
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 46-55
- ISSN
- 0022-1015 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2041389336
- Cited by
- 1,570
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 3.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.