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Reactions to victims under conditions of situational detachment: The effect of responsibility, severity, and expected future interaction.

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Stokols, Daniel, Schopler, John · 1973 · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Cited by 53

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Discusses M. Lerner and C. Simmons's (see record) suggestion that people tend to derogate innocent victims. A crucial assumption underlying Lerner's approach is that Os, unable to ascribe some misdeed to a victim, will attempt to convince themselves that the victim deserved his suffering by attributing personal unworthiness to him. In an experiment with 128 female undergraduates, the O's situational removal from the victim's misfortune was held constant, facilitating separation and assessment of factors that have been interlocked in previous research. Ss learned about the victim's problem through examination of a clinical data folder; they either did, or did not, expect to meet the victim at a subsequent experimental session. The victim was portrayed as either innocent or responsible for her misfortune, and her suffering was described as either severe or mild. Consistent with predictions, innocent victims were not derogated vis-a-vis responsible ones; victims of severe suffering were evaluated less favorably than those of mild misfortune; and Ss who expected to meet the victim rated her more favorably than those who did not anticipate future interaction with her. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved). © 1973 American Psychological Association.

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Crossref · 10.1037/h0033966

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Metadata

Authors
Stokols, D., & Schopler, J.
Venue
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Published
1973-02
Volume
25
Issue
2
Pages
199-209
ISSN
  • 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1315
OpenAlex
W2168152195
Cited by
53
References
2
FWCI
39.77
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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