Consequences, norms, and generalized inaction in moral dilemmas: the CNI model of moral decision-making
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Research on moral dilemma judgments has been fundamentally shaped by the distinction between utilitarianism and deontology. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consequences; the principle of deontology states that the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, researchers have investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley problem). However, the conceptual meaning of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the central aspects of utilitarianism and deontology-consequences and norms-are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming undermines theoretical interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that resolves the ambiguities of the traditional paradigm. Expanding on this approach, we present a multinomial model that allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms (I) in responses to moral dilemmas. We present 8 studies that used this model to investigate the effects of gender, cognitive load, question framing, and psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. The findings obtained with the proposed CNI model offer more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma…
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In AV dilemma scenarios, most participants showed a moral inclination toward utilitarianism, even when it entailed self-sacrifice.
“In dilemma scenario of AVs, scholars also observed that most participants showed a moral inclination toward utilitarianism, even when it entailed self-sacrifice (Bonnefon et al., 2016; Gawronski et al., 2017; Bergmann et al., 2018; Faulhaber et al., 2019).”
From Exploring moral algorithm preferences in autonomous vehicle dilemmas: an empirical study (2023) · cites this paper as Gawronski et al., 2017
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Cited by 278
- Authors
- Gawronski, B., Armstrong, J., Conway, P., Friesdorf, R., & Hütter, M.
- Affiliations
- The University of Texas at Austin (US)
- Western University (CA)
- Florida State University (US)
- Wilfrid Laurier University (CA)
- University of Tübingen (DE)
- Venue
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Published
- 2017-09
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 343-376
- ISSN
- 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1315
- OpenAlex
- W2746351266
- Cited by
- 278
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 34 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 41 · 2023: 40 · 2022: 37 · 2021: 36 · 2020: 30 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 11
- FWCI
- 9.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- ePrints Soton (University of Southampton) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (1449620)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- ethical dilemmas, ethical decision-making, utilitarianism, deontology, consequences, moral norms, CNI model, multinomial model, trolley problem, gender differences, cognitive load, question framing, psychopathy
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Decision Making, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Middle Aged, Morals, Ethical Theory, Young Adult
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