When enough is not enough: Information overload and metacognitive decisions to stop studying information
Open accessAbstract
People are often exposed to more information than they can actually remember. Despite this frequent form of information overload, little is known about how much information people choose to remember. Using a novel "stop" paradigm, the current research examined whether and how people choose to stop receiving new-possibly overwhelming-information with the intent to maximize memory performance. Participants were presented with a long list of items and were rewarded for the number of correctly remembered words in a following free recall test. Critically, participants in a stop condition were provided with the option to stop the presentation of the remaining words at any time during the list, whereas participants in a control condition were presented with all items. Across 5 experiments, the authors found that participants tended to stop the presentation of the items to maximize the number of recalled items, but this decision ironically led to decreased memory performance relative to the control group. This pattern was consistent even after controlling for possible confounding factors (e.g., task demands). The results indicated a general, false belief that we can remember a larger number of items if we restrict the quantity of learning materials. These findings suggest people have an incomplete understanding of how we remember excessive amounts of information. (PsycINFO Database Record
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Learners with stronger prior knowledge or more developed metacognitive regulation may be better able to recognize the limitations of fluent AI-generated explanations and therefore less likely to equate processing ease with genuine understanding.
“Learners with stronger prior knowledge or more developed metacognitive regulation may be better able to recognize the limitations of fluent AI-generated explanations and therefore less likely to equate processing ease with genuine understanding [33].”
From Fluency Illusion: A Review on Influence of ChatGPT in Classroom Settings (2026) · cites this paper as [33]
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 2 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 55 · Cited by 48
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Kausler DH 1994 Learning and memory in normal aging San Diego, CA Academic Press
- Authors
- Murayama, K., Blake, A. B., Kerr, T., & Castel, A. D.
- Affiliations
- University of California System (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition
- Published
- 2016-06
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 914-924
- ISSN
- 0278-7393 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1285
- PMC
- PMC4877291
- OpenAlex
- W1767450531
- Cited by
- 48
- References
- 55
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 1
- FWCI
- 1.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- CentAUR (University of Reading) (acceptedVersion)
- eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Marie Curie Career Integration Grant (CIG630680)
- JSPS KAKENHI (15H05401)
- National Institutes of Health (R01AG044335)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Cognitive Functions and Memory
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Visual and Cognitive Learning Processes
- Keywords
- information overload, metacognition, stopping decisions, memory performance, free recall, metacognitive beliefs, metacognitive monitoring
- MeSH terms
- Metacognition, Adult, Decision Making, Female, Humans, Learning, Male, Psychological Tests, Random Allocation, Mental Recall, Reward, Young Adult
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review