Help and you shall be helped
Integrity signals
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In a population of discriminators, unconditional cooperators can increase by random drift and eventually invite the invasion of defectors.
“In a population of discriminators, unconditional cooperators can increase by random drift and eventually invite the invasion of defectors.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [38]
The cooperative outcome in the indirect reciprocity model lacks stability.
“The second issue concerns the lack of stability of the cooperative outcome.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [38]
The simulations display occasional bursts of defection, which are based on a previous build-up of undiscriminating altruists.
“The simulations display occasional bursts of defection, which are based on a previous build-up of undiscriminating altruists.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [38]
If such a consensual assessment can be achieved, the corresponding strategy is robust.
“If such a consensual assessment can be achieved, the corresponding strategy is robust 38,39,41 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [38]
A more sophisticated assessment rule should distinguish between justified and unjustified defection, taking into account the score of the receiver.
“A more sophisticated assessment rule should distinguish between justified and unjustified defection, and thus take into account the score of the receiver: someone withholding help from a 'bad' player should not pay with a reduced score 35,38,39,47 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [38]
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References 3 · Cited by 20
- Authors
- Ferrière, R.
- Affiliations
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Corresponding author
- Ferrière, Régis
- ORCID
- Ferrière, Régis
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 1998-06
- Volume
- 393
- Issue
- 6685
- Pages
- 517-519
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W1965441517
- Cited by
- 20
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2021: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 4.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- IIASA PURE (International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- moral development, cooperation, one-shot interactions, reputation, repeated games, social behavior, evolutionary game theory
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Helping Behavior, Humans, Models, Biological, Morals, Selection, Genetic
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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