Flexible combination of reward information across primates
Open accessAbstract
A fundamental but rarely contested assumption in economics and neuroeconomics is that decision-makers compute subjective values of risky options by multiplying functions of reward probability and magnitude. By contrast, an additive strategy for valuation allows flexible combination of reward information required in uncertain or changing environments. We hypothesized that the level of uncertainty in the reward environment should determine the strategy used for valuation and choice. To test this hypothesis, we examined choice between risky options in humans and rhesus macaques across three tasks with different levels of uncertainty. We found that whereas humans and monkeys adopted a multiplicative strategy under risk when probabilities are known, both species spontaneously adopted an additive strategy under uncertainty when probabilities must be learned. Additionally, the level of volatility influenced relative weighting of certain and uncertain reward information, and this was reflected in the encoding of reward magnitude by neurons in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
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Higher perceptual rating in the current trial was associated with higher expectation rating in the next trial with a different cue type.
“Interestingly, higher perceptual rating in the current trial was associated with higher expectation rating in the next trial with a different cue type (SI Appendix, Figs. S8–S10) which suggests: 1) the existence of a carryover effect (61–63) from the previous to the current trial independent of the cue, or 2) a general learning of stimulus history.”
From Social information creates self-fulfilling prophecies in judgments of pain, vicarious pain, and cognitive effort (2026) · cites this paper as [62]
The Methods section on human tasks says participants used outcomes from preceding trials to choose between reward targets, but it does not report perceptual or expectation ratings. Searches for the stated cross-trial association and for a cue-independent carryover effect found no passage addressing either point; page numbers were unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)
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References 28 · Cited by 112
- Authors
- Farashahi, S., Donahue, C. H., Hayden, B. Y., Lee, D., & Soltani, A.
- Affiliations
- Dartmouth College (US)
- Gladstone Institutes (US)
- University of Minnesota (US)
- Johns Hopkins University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Soltani, Alireza
- Venue
- Nature Human Behaviour
- Published
- 2019-09-09
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 1215-1224
- ISSN
- 2397-3374 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC6856432
- OpenAlex
- W2973034539
- Cited by
- 112
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 6
- FWCI
- 10.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- Locations
- Nature Human Behaviour (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | National Institutes of Health (R01 DA029330, R01 MH108629)
- National Science Foundation (EPSCoR Award 1632738)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- subjective value, decision making under risk, reward probability, reward magnitude, uncertainty, probability learning, volatility, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, rhesus monkeys, cross-species comparison, neuroeconomics
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Animals, Choice Behavior, Decision Making, Female, Humans, Macaca mulatta, Male, Probability, Reward, Risk, Comprehension, Uncertainty, Young Adult
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