Learning task-state representations
Open accessAbstract
Arguably, the most difficult part of learning is deciding what to learn about. Should I associate the positive outcome of safely completing a street-crossing with the situation ‘the car approaching the crosswalk was red’ or with ‘the approaching car was slowing down’? In this Perspective, we summarize our recent research into the computational and neural underpinnings of ‘representation learning’—how humans (and other animals) construct task representations that allow efficient learning and decision-making. We first discuss the problem of learning what to ignore when confronted with too much information, so that experience can properly generalize across situations. We then turn to the problem of augmenting perceptual information with inferred latent causes that embody unobservable task-relevant information, such as contextual knowledge. Finally, we discuss recent findings regarding the neural substrates of task representations that suggest the orbitofrontal cortex represents ‘task states’, deploying them for decision-making and learning elsewhere in the brain. When crossing the street, you can ignore the color of oncoming cars, but for hailing a taxi color is important. How do we learn what to represent neurally for each task? Here, Niv summarizes a decade of work on representation learning in the brain.
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The latent structure of CSCG gives flexibility to split the same observation in different sequential contexts or merge different temporal contexts into the same latent state, while mitigating the local minima problem.
“This kind of latent structure gives the flexibility to split the same observation in different sequential contexts or merge different temporal contexts into the same latent state (12), as shown in Fig. 1, while mitigating the local minima problem associated with learning latent space models (15).”
From Space is a latent sequence: A theory of the hippocampus (2024) · cites this paper as [12]
In “The role of inference and context in shaping task representations” (page unavailable), Niv says externally similar situations may need separate states in different contexts, while different situations may be grouped into one state. This supports the split-or-merge principle attributed to citation (12), but the paper does not establish it as a property of CSCG specifically. The local-minima point is attached to citation (15), not this source. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredTo develop internal space-like maps from aliased sensations and egocentric actions, the learning agent has to appropriately split or merge sensations based on sequential contexts.
“To develop internal space-like maps from these aliased sensations and egocentric actions (as illustrated in the sketch in Fig. 1A), the learning agent has to appropriately split or merge sensations based on sequential contexts (Fig. 1B) (12, 13).”
From Space is a latent sequence: A theory of the hippocampus (2024) · cites this paper as [12]
In “The role of inference and context in shaping task representations” (page unavailable), the paper says externally similar situations may need to be split into different states by context, while different situations may be grouped into one state. It does not specifically describe building space-like maps from aliased sensations and egocentric actions, or specify sequential context as the basis for that mapping. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 100 · Cited by 356
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- [12]Watkins CJ, & Dayan P (1992). Q-learning. Machine learning, 8(3–4), 279– 292.
- Authors
- Niv, Y.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Niv, Yael
- ORCID
- Niv, Yael
- Venue
- Nature Neuroscience
- Published
- 2019-09-24
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 1544-1553
- ISSN
- 1097-6256 (ISSN-L)
- 1546-1726
- PMC
- PMC7241310
- OpenAlex
- W2976241900
- Semantic Scholar
- 2615eb2a695f623ab7d9d929b999ce2901f33612
- Cited by
- 356
- References
- 100
- Citations by year
- 2026: 38 · 2025: 63 · 2024: 63 · 2023: 49 · 2022: 49 · 2021: 62 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 6
- FWCI
- 4.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Nature Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- United States Department of Defense | United States Army | U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command | Army Research Office (W911NF-14-1-0101)
- U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | NIH | National Institute on Drug Abuse (R01DA042065)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory and Neural Mechanisms
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Keywords
- representation learning, orbitofrontal cortex, perceptual inference, contextual knowledge, decision-making, computational models of learning
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Decision Making, Generalization, Psychological, Humans, Learning, Prefrontal Cortex
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review