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The impact of variable commitment in the Naming Game on consensus formation

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Abstract

The Naming Game has proven to be an important model of opinion dynamics in complex networks. It is significantly enriched by the introduction of nodes committed to a single opinion. The resulting model is still simple but captures core concepts of opinion dynamics in networks. This model limitation is rigid commitment which never changes. Here we study the effect that making commitment variable has on the dynamics of the system. Committed nodes are assigned a commitment strength, w, defining their willingness to lose (in waning), gain (for increasing) or both (in variable) commitment to an opinion. Such model has committed nodes that can stick to a single opinion for some time without losing their flexibility to change it in the long run. The traditional Naming Game corresponds to setting w at infinity. A change in commitment strength impacts the critical fraction of population necessary for a minority consensus. Increasing w lowers critical fraction for waning commitment but increases this fraction for increasing commitment. Further, we show that if different nodes have different values of w, higher standard deviation of w increases the critical fraction for waning commitment and decrease this fraction for increasing commitment.

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Crossref · 10.1038/srep41750

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Figures

Figure 1 Mean-field diagram of the waning commitment naming game with single committed group. The quantity m is calculated when the steady state condition of a system is satisfied. The system starts with the initial values of a0 = c = 0, b0 = 1 − pA. Three regions of fixed points, Ia, Ib and II are shown and discusses in the text.
Figure 1 Mean-field diagram of the waning commitment naming game with single committed group. The quantity m is calculated when the steady state condition of a system is satisfied. The system starts with the initial values of a0 = c = 0, b0 = 1 − pA. Three regions of fixed points, Ia, Ib and II are shown and discusses in the text.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 Mean-field diagram of the waning commitment naming game with two competing committed groups. The plots are calculated by the mean-field equations with commitment strength w = 10. (1) The left plot is a phase diagram containing three regions, in which the system has different fixed points. (2) The right plots show trajectories of points in regions I and II. The upper right plot is for the case where pA = 0.35 and pB = 0.2. The lower right plot is for the case where pA = 0.05 and pB = 0.1.
Figure 2 Mean-field diagram of the waning commitment naming game with two competing committed groups. The plots are calculated by the mean-field equations with commitment strength w = 10. (1) The left plot is a phase diagram containing three regions, in which the system has different fixed points. (2) The right plots show trajectories of points in regions I and II. The upper right plot is for the case where pA = 0.35 and pB = 0.2. The lower right plot is for the case where pA = 0.05 and pB = 0.1.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3 The critical value function of the waning commitment naming game. The top plot shows critical values of the fraction of committed agents with different commitment strengths. The bottom plot shows the differences between pc(w) and pc(∞). The critical value function is an exponential one especially when the commitment strength is large.
Figure 3 The critical value function of the waning commitment naming game. The top plot shows critical values of the fraction of committed agents with different commitment strengths. The bottom plot shows the differences between pc(w) and pc(∞). The critical value function is an exponential one especially when the commitment strength is large.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 4 Mean-field diagram of the increasing commitment naming game with two competing committed groups. The plots are calculated by the mean-field equations with commitment strength w = 10. (1) The left plot is a phase diagram containing three regions. (2) The right plots show trajectories of points in region I and III. The top right is the case where (pA = 0.1, pB = 0.45) and the bottom right is the case where (pA = 0.2, pB = 0.1).
Figure 4 Mean-field diagram of the increasing commitment naming game with two competing committed groups. The plots are calculated by the mean-field equations with commitment strength w = 10. (1) The left plot is a phase diagram containing three regions. (2) The right plots show trajectories of points in region I and III. The top right is the case where (pA = 0.1, pB = 0.45) and the bottom right is the case where (pA = 0.2, pB = 0.1).CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 5 The critical value function of the increasing commitment naming game. The top plot shows critical values of the fraction of committed agents with different commitment strengths. The bottom plot shows the differences between pc(w) and pc(∞). Both plots shows our function fits data well.
Figure 5 The critical value function of the increasing commitment naming game. The top plot shows critical values of the fraction of committed agents with different commitment strengths. The bottom plot shows the differences between pc(w) and pc(∞). Both plots shows our function fits data well.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 6 The critical value curves comparison. All the experiments are based on networks generated by Barabasi-Albert (BA)17 and Erdos-Renyi (ER) models with parameters N = 1000, m0 = m = 5, p ≈ 0.01, where the average degree of each network is 10, the mean of commitment strengths of each distribution is 10. The standard deviation in each case is 0, 2, 5.196 and 16.3 for constant value, and then distributed normally, uniformly and according to power-law commitment strengths. Each critical value is averaged over 100 runs, half runs reaches consensus state A, while the other half reaches consensus state B. For simplicity, we just plot the critical values when pA > pB. Subfigures (a) and (b) show the critical value curves in the waning commitment naming game. pA, pB are the initial fractions of committed agents at state A, B. Subfigures (c) and (d) show the critical value curves in the variable commitment naming game. The variable commitment yields very similar results to increasing commitment, but runs much faster. pA, pB are the initial fractions of agents able to commit at state A, B, which are initialized as uncommitted, but are likely to become committed during interactions. Subfigures (a) and (c) are simulations in BA networks, while subfigures (b) and (d) are simulations in ER networks.
Figure 6 The critical value curves comparison. All the experiments are based on networks generated by Barabasi-Albert (BA)17 and Erdos-Renyi (ER) models with parameters N = 1000, m0 = m = 5, p ≈ 0.01, where the average degree of each network is 10, the mean of commitment strengths of each distribution is 10. The standard deviation in each case is 0, 2, 5.196 and 16.3 for constant value, and then distributed normally, uniformly and according to power-law commitment strengths. Each critical value is averaged over 100 runs, half runs reaches consensus state A, while the other half reaches consensus state B. For simplicity, we just plot the critical values when pA > pB. Subfigures (a) and (b) show the critical value curves in the waning commitment naming game. pA, pB are the initial fractions of committed agents at state A, B. Subfigures (c) and (d) show the critical value curves in the variable commitment naming game. The variable commitment yields very similar results to increasing commitment, but runs much faster. pA, pB are the initial fractions of agents able to commit at state A, B, which are initialized as uncommitted, but are likely to become committed during interactions. Subfigures (a) and (c) are simulations in BA networks, while subfigures (b) and (d) are simulations in ER networks.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 7 The critical value curves comparisons of matching equal, inverse or random ranks of node degrees and commitments. The committed agents are selected by three different strategies mentioned above. All the experiments are based on networks generated by Barabasi-Albert (BA) and Erdos-Renyi (ER) models with parameters N = 1000, m0 = m = 5, p ≈ 0.01, where the average degree of each network is 10, the mean of commitment strengths of each distribution is 10. Each critical value is averaged over 100 runs. For all subfigures, the x-axis is pA, the y-axis is pB. For simplicity, we just plot the critical values when pA > pB. Subfigures (a–f) show experiments of the waning commitment naming game, while subfigures (g–l) show experiments of the variable commitment naming game. Subfigures (a–c) and (g–i) are simulations in BA networks, while subfigures (d–f) and (j–l) are simulations in ER networks.
Figure 7 The critical value curves comparisons of matching equal, inverse or random ranks of node degrees and commitments. The committed agents are selected by three different strategies mentioned above. All the experiments are based on networks generated by Barabasi-Albert (BA) and Erdos-Renyi (ER) models with parameters N = 1000, m0 = m = 5, p ≈ 0.01, where the average degree of each network is 10, the mean of commitment strengths of each distribution is 10. Each critical value is averaged over 100 runs. For all subfigures, the x-axis is pA, the y-axis is pB. For simplicity, we just plot the critical values when pA > pB. Subfigures (a–f) show experiments of the waning commitment naming game, while subfigures (g–l) show experiments of the variable commitment naming game. Subfigures (a–c) and (g–i) are simulations in BA networks, while subfigures (d–f) and (j–l) are simulations in ER networks.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 8 The start times of system with each commitment strength w at its critical point.
Figure 8 The start times of system with each commitment strength w at its critical point.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Metadata

Authors
Niu, X., Doyle, C., Korniss, G., & Szymanski, B. K.
Affiliations
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (US)
Corresponding author
Niu, Xiang
Venue
Scientific Reports
Published
2017-02-02
Volume
7
Issue
1
Pages
41750-41750
ISSN
2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2585768368
Cited by
39
References
19
Citations by year
2025: 12 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 2
FWCI
1.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • Office of Naval Research (N00014-15-1-2640, W911NF-09-2-0053, N00014)
  • Army Research Laboratory (N00014-15-1-2640, W911NF, W911NF-09-2-0053)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Network Analysis Techniques
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis
Keywords
naming game, opinion dynamics, consensus formation, complex networks

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