CoChat

Quality of Care in the United Kingdom after Removal of Financial Incentives

Open access
Minchin, Mark, Roland, Martin, Richardson, Judith, Rowark, Shaun, Guthrie, Bruce · 2018 · New England Journal of Medicine
Cited by 129

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

BACKGROUND: The benefits of pay-for-performance schemes in improving the quality of care remain uncertain. There is little information on the effect of removing incentives from existing pay-for-performance schemes. METHODS: We conducted interrupted time-series analyses of electronic medical record (EMR) data from 2010 to 2017 for 12 quality-of-care indicators in the United Kingdom's Quality and Outcomes Framework for which financial incentives were removed in 2014 and 6 indicators for which incentives were maintained. We estimated the effects of removing incentives on changes in performance on quality-of-care measures. RESULTS: Complete longitudinal data were available for 2819 English primary care practices with more than 20 million registered patients. There were immediate reductions in documented quality of care for all 12 indicators in the first year after the removal of financial incentives. Reductions were greatest for indicators related to health advice, with a reduction of 62.3 percentage points (95% confidence interval [CI], -65.6 to -59.0) in EMR documentation of lifestyle counseling for patients with hypertension. Changes were smaller for indicators involving clinical actions that automatically update the EMR, such as laboratory testing, with a reduction of 10.7 percentage points (95% CI, -13.6 to -7.8) in control of cholesterol in patients with coronary heart disease and 12.1 percentage points (95% CI, -13.6 to -10.6) for thyroid-function testing in patients with hypothyroidism. There was little change in performance on the 6 quality measures for which incentives were maintained. CONCLUSIONS: Removal of financial incentives was associated with an immediate decline in performance on quality measures. In part, the decline probably reflected changes in EMR documentation, but declines on measures involving laboratory testing suggest that incentive removal also changed the care delivered.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1056/nejmsa1801495

Cites

4 of 4 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 4 references

Cited by

See all 129

Metadata

Authors
Minchin, M., Roland, M., Richardson, J., Rowark, S., & Guthrie, B.
Venue
New England Journal of Medicine
Published
2018-09-06
Volume
379
Issue
10
Pages
948-957
ISSN
  • 0028-4793 (ISSN-L)
  • 1533-4406
OpenAlex
W2890525342
Cited by
129
References
4
FWCI
21.44
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Quality of Care in the United Kingdom after Removal of Financial Incentives. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1056/nejmsa1801495
The paper
Minchin, M., Roland, M., Richardson, J., Rowark, S., & Guthrie, B. (2018). Quality of Care in the United Kingdom after Removal of Financial Incentives. New England Journal of Medicine. https://doi.org/10.1056/nejmsa1801495

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.