The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The spread of innovations in social networks
Open accessAbstract
Which network structures favor the rapid spread of new ideas, behaviors, or technologies? This question has been studied extensively using epidemic models. Here we consider a complementary point of view and consider scenarios where the individuals’ behavior is the result of a strategic choice among competing alternatives. In particular, we study models that are based on the dynamics of coordination games. Classical results in game theory studying this model provide a simple condition for a new action or innovation to become widespread in the network. The present paper characterizes the rate of convergence as a function of the structure of the interaction network. The resulting predictions differ strongly from the ones provided by epidemic models. In particular, it appears that innovation spreads much more slowly on well-connected network structures dominated by long-range links than in low-dimensional ones dominated, for example, by geographic proximity.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Micromotives and Macrobehavior
Eaton, B. C., & Schelling, T. C. (1981) · The Canadian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/134812 · Cited by 3,758
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1023 · Cited by 2,545
The Theory of Learning in Games
Drew Fudenberg, B., & Levine, D. K. (1998) · MIT Press Books · Cited by 2,455
Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in GamesPreprint
Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1988) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 2,104
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951777 · Cited by 2,044
Stochastic Interacting Systems: Contact, Voter and Exclusion Processes
Liggett, T. M. (1999) · Grundlehren der mathematischen Wissenschaften · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-03990-8 · Cited by 1,554
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
Skyrms, B. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139165228 · Cited by 1,524
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games.
Stinchcombe, A. L., Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1989) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2073314 · Cited by 1,264
Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
Ellison, G. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951493 · Cited by 1,106
Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions
Mezzetti, C., & Young, H. P. (1999) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061165 · Cited by 851
Approximate counting, uniform generation and rapidly mixing Markov chains
Sinclair, A., & Jerrum, M. (1989) · Information and Computation · doi:10.1016/0890-5401(89)90067-9 · Cited by 735
(2008) · Kybernetes · doi:10.1108/03684920810884423 · Cited by 582
Comparison Theorems for Reversible Markov Chains
Diaconis, P., & Saloff-Coste, L. (1993) · The Annals of Applied Probability · doi:10.1214/aoap/1177005359 · Cited by 423
The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision
Blume, L. E. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1046 · Cited by 351
Cascading Behavior in Networks: Algorithmic and Economic Issues
Kleinberg, J. (2007) · Algorithmic Game Theory · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511800481.026 · Cited by 279
Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions
Robson, A. J., & Young, H. P. (1999) · The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique · doi:10.2307/136405 · Cited by 254
Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions
Albin, P. S., & Foley, D. K. (2001) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00149-4 · Cited by 164
On certain connectivity properties of the internet topology
Mihail, M., Papadimitriou, C. H., & Saberi, A. (2005) · Journal of Computer and System Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.jcss.2005.06.009 · Cited by 142
Self-citationConductance and congestion in power law graphs
Gkantsidis, C., Mihail, M., & Saberi, A. (2003) · ACM SIGMETRICS International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems (SIGMETRICS) · doi:10.1145/781027.781046 · Cited by 122
Self-citationThe Economy As an Evolving Complex System III: Current Perspectives and Future DirectionsPreprint
Blume, L. E., & Durlauf, S. N. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 91
Expansion and Lack Thereof in Randomly Perturbed Graphs
Flaxman, A. D. (2008) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-78808-9_3 · Cited by 40
Conductance and congestion in power law graphs
Gkantsidis, C., Mihail, M., & Saberi, A. (2003) · ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review · doi:10.1145/885651.781046 · Cited by 35
Self-citationExpansion and Lack Thereof in Randomly Perturbed Graphs
Flaxman, A. D. (2007) · Internet Mathematics · doi:10.1080/15427951.2007.10129290 · Cited by 29
Cited by
Globally networked risks and how to respond
Helbing, D. (2013) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature12047 · Cited by 1,281
How Homophily Affects the Speed of Learning and Best-Response Dynamics
Golub, B., & Jackson, M. O. (2012) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjs021 · Cited by 492
Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation
Marden, J. R., & Shamma, J. S. (2012) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.006 · Cited by 301
The spontaneous emergence of conventions: An experimental study of cultural evolution
Centola, D., & Baronchelli, A. (2015) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1418838112 · Cited by 282
The dynamics of social innovation
Young, H. P. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1100973108 · Cited by 276
Metadata
- Authors
- Montanari, A., & Saberi, A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2010-11-12
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 47
- Pages
- 20196-20201
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2019542451
- Cited by
- 381
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 12.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.