Cited by 155Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEconomic Theory and Institutions

Maximization, learning, and economic behavior

Open access
Erev, Ido, Roth, Alvin E.·2014·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Abstract

The rationality assumption that underlies mainstream economic theory has proved to be a useful approximation, despite the fact that systematic violations to its predictions can be found. That is, the assumption of rational behavior is useful in understanding the ways in which many successful economic institutions function, although it is also true that actual human behavior falls systematically short of perfect rationality. We consider a possible explanation of this apparent inconsistency, suggesting that mechanisms that rest on the rationality assumption are likely to be successful when they create an environment in which the behavior they try to facilitate leads to the best payoff for all agents on average, and most of the time. Review of basic learning research suggests that, under these conditions, people quickly learn to maximize expected return. This review also shows that there are many situations in which experience does not increase maximization. In many cases, experience leads people to underweight rare events. In addition, the current paper suggests that it is convenient to distinguish between two behavioral approaches to improve economic analyses. The first, and more conventional approach among behavioral economists and psychologists interested in judgment and decision making, highlights violations of the rational model and proposes descriptive models that capture these violations. The second approach studies human learning to clarify the conditions under which people quickly learn to maximize expected return. The current review highlights one set of conditions of this type and shows how the understanding of these conditions can facilitate market design.

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Authors
Erev, I., & Roth, A. E.
Affiliations
  • Technion – Israel Institute of Technology (IL)
  • Stanford University (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2014-07-14
Volume
111
Issue
supplement_3
Pages
10818-10825
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W2001436017
Cited by
155
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 7
FWCI
1.48
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation
  • Israel Science Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
Keywords
rationality assumption, bounded rationality, learning, expected return maximization, experience effects, behavioral economics, market design, economic institutions, judgment and decision making, descriptive model
MeSH terms
Adaptation, Psychological, Choice Behavior, Decision Making, Game Theory, Humans, Learning, Reinforcement, Psychology, Feedback, Physiological

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