Expanding the active mind
Abstract
What I call the active mind approach revolves around the claim that what is “on” a person’s mind is in an important sense brought on and held on to through the agent’s self-conscious rational activity. In the first part, I state the gist of this perspective in a deliberately strong way in order to create a touchstone for critical discussion. In the second part, I engage with two categories of our mental lives that seem to speak against construing the mind as active. First, I discuss affectivity, in particular emotion, and show that emotional episodes are active engagements. Second, I discuss habitual action, and in particular those manifestations of habit which are initially opaque to the agent. In my responses to both objections, the notion of a practical self-understanding will play a central role. The result will be a qualified defence and expansion of the active mind position.
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Various international law frameworks recognise a right not to have one's thoughts or opinions revealed or manipulated.
“Various international law frameworks recognise a right not to have one’s thoughts or opinions revealed [35] or manipulated [36].”
From Ethical considerations for the use of brain–computer interfaces for cognitive enhancement (2024) · cites this paper as [36]
Cites
Gallagher, S. (2013) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.03.008 · Cited by 378 · see citing works
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Ethical considerations for the use of brain–computer interfaces for cognitive enhancement
Gordon, E. C., & Seth, A. K. (2024) · PLOS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.3002899 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
- Authors
- Slaby, J.
- Affiliations
- Freie Universität Berlin (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Slaby, Jan
- ORCID
- Slaby, Jan
- Venue
- Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2021-04-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 193-209
- ISSN
- 0007-1773 (ISSN-L)
- 2332-0486
- OpenAlex
- W3142457791
- Cited by
- 8
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 3
- FWCI
- 1.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (SFB 1171 B05)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- active mind, emotions, affectivity, habitual behavior, habit, Phenomenology of Spirit, self-consciousness
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