Large Language Models Can Argue in Convincing Ways About Politics, But Humans Dislike AI Authors: implications for Governance
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Abstract
All politics relies on rhetorical appeals, and the ability to make arguments is considered perhaps uniquely human. But as recent times have seen successful large language model (LLM) applications to similar endeavours, we explore whether these approaches can out-compete humans in making appeals for/against various positions in US politics. We curate responses from crowdsourced workers and an LLM and place them in competition with one another. Human (crowd) judges make decisions about the relative strength of their (human v machine) efforts. We have several empirical ‘possibility’ results. First, LLMs can produce novel arguments that convince independent judges at least on a par with human efforts. Yet when informed about an orator’s true identity, judges show a preference for human over LLM arguments. This may suggest voters view such models as potentially dangerous; we think politicians should be aware of related ‘liar’s dividend’ concerns.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Palmer, A., & Spirling, A.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Palmer, Alexis
- Venue
- Political Science
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2023-09-02
- Volume
- 75
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 281-291
- ISSN
- 0032-3187 (ISSN-L)
- 2041-0611
- OpenAlex
- W4394887980
- Cited by
- 23
- References
- 19
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 1
- FWCI
- 5.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Political Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Communication › Rhetoric and Communication Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Keywords
- large language models, political persuasion, rhetorical appeals, argumentation, AI authorship, political rhetoric, AI governance, American politics
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Large Language Models Can Argue in Convincing Ways About Politics, But Humans Dislike AI Authors: implications for Governance. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/00323187.2024.2335471
- The paper
- Palmer, A., & Spirling, A. (2023). Large Language Models Can Argue in Convincing Ways About Politics, But Humans Dislike AI Authors: implications for Governance. Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2024.2335471
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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