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‘Hearts and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq

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Dixon, Paul · 2009 · Journal of Strategic Studies
Cited by 197

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Abstract

This article introduces this special issue of The Journal of Strategic Studies by discussing the British model of counter-insurgency. General (later Field Marshal) Sir Gerald Templer associated the phrase ‘hearts and minds’ with Britain's apparently successful counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya (1948–60). The phrase ‘hearts and minds’ is generally associated with a less coercive approach to counter-insurgency which emphasises the importance of using ‘minimum force’ in order to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people. This article argues that the phrase ‘hearts and minds’ does not accurately describe Britain's highly coercive campaign in Malaya. The British approach in Malaya did involve high levels of force, was not fought within the law and led to abuses of human rights. Britain's counter-insurgency campaign in Northern Ireland did not deploy the same levels of coercion that were used in Malaya but, nevertheless, considerable levels of coercion were used which did not succeed in winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local people. The various interpretations of ‘hearts and minds’ leads to confusion about what degree of consent should be expected from the people and the implication of this for the use of force. While the term ‘hearts and minds’ does not accurately represent Britain's experience of counter-insurgency in the retreat from Empire; in the post-Cold War period the British military has been generally more ‘political’ and less coercive in its approach to counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq than the more conventional US approach to counter-insurgency. The British approach to counter-insurgency has influenced the recent development of US counter-insurgency doctrine but there are still considerable differences in the British and US approach to counter-insurgency which has led to severe tensions in the relationship between these allies. The ‘hearts and minds’ description of the British approach to counter-insurgency may be useful in public relations terms but it undermines the theory as a guide to operations because it can be interpreted in such divergent ways. The future may be to more carefully and practically specify in what contexts and circumstances the deployment of force is legitimate.

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Metadata

Authors
Dixon, P.
Venue
Journal of Strategic Studies
Published
2009-06
Volume
32
Issue
3
Pages
353-381
ISSN
  • 0140-2390 (ISSN-L)
  • 1743-937X
OpenAlex
W2094076932
Cited by
197
References
0
FWCI
63.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: ‘Hearts and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/01402390902928172
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Dixon, P. (2009). ‘Hearts and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq. Journal of Strategic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390902928172

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