The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice
Open accessAbstract
This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by Miranda Fricker, the injustice of perceiving another epistemic agent as less credible due to an identity prejudice. I first analyze Fricker’s account of the harm, which she posits in terms of a subject/object relation as “epistemic objectification.” My analysis, however, shows that (1) testimonial injustice does not render its victim to an object-like status and (2) testimonial injustice necessarily treats its victim as a subject, albeit a truncated subject. Drawing on the work of Ann Cahill and Simone de Beauvoir, I demonstrate that the primary harm of testimonial injustice is more aptly described in terms of a subject/other relation, or a relation that circumscribes the subjectivity of its victim within the confines of the perpetrator’s subjectivity. Using these conceptual resources to examine the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice not only avoids the problems I raise with the notion of epistemic objectification, but also greatly enhances our understanding of testimonial injustice, and consequently of what more epistemically just relations look like.
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Citations
Cites
Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning
Barad, K. (2006) · doi:10.2307/j.ctv12101zq · Cited by 10,472
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198
Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing
Dotson, K. (2011) · Hypatia · doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x · Cited by 2,150 · cited 1×
“For a detailed account of these aspects of such situations, see Dotson (2011), especially her notion of “testimonial smothering” (244–251).”
Background
Cited by
Epistemic Injustice and Illness
Kidd, I. J., & Carel, H. (2017) · Journal of Applied Philosophy · doi:10.1111/japp.12172 · Cited by 466
Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice
Davis, E. (2016) · Hypatia · doi:10.1111/hypa.12251 · Cited by 338
Epistemic Agency Under Oppression
Pohlhaus, G. (2020) · Philosophical Papers · doi:10.1080/05568641.2020.1780149 · Cited by 115
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Pohlhaus, G.
- Venue
- Social Epistemology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2013-11-05
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 99-114
- ISSN
- 0269-1728 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-5297
- OpenAlex
- W2035217659
- Cited by
- 225
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 6.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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