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Cited by 14Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsMisinformation and Its ImpactsFeminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

The Information Environment and Blameworthy Beliefs

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Millar, Boyd·2019·Social Epistemology
DOI 10.1080/02691728.2019.1676840
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Abstract

Thanks to the advent of social media, large numbers of Americans believe outlandish falsehoods that have been widely debunked. Many of us have a tendency to fault the individuals who hold such beliefs. We naturally assume that the individuals who form and maintain such beliefs do so in virtue of having violated some epistemic obligation: perhaps they failed to scrutinize their sources, or failed to seek out the available competing evidence. I maintain that very many ordinary individuals who acquire outlandish false beliefs thanks to their use of popular social media platforms (and other similar internet technologies) deserve little or no blame for believing these falsehoods. Such individuals would be fully blameworthy only if they had formed or maintained the relevant beliefs partly in virtue of violating some epistemic obligation and had no excuse for violating that obligation. However, the nature of these internet technologies provides excuses for violating the relevant epistemic obligations, and so individuals are excused for holding the resulting false beliefs.

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  • Epistemic guilt or blameworthiness requires more than epistemic non-innocence; it requires a failure of epistemic obligation without excuse.

    “Hence, epistemic guilt or blameworthiness requires more than epistemic non-innocence.It requires a failure of epistemic obligation, for instance, to seek evidence, or think critically, without excuse (Millar, 2019).”

    From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Millar, 2019

    Section 2, “Blameworthy Beliefs and Excuses” (page unavailable), says blame for a problematic belief requires a violation of an epistemic obligation and that an excuse can remove blame. But it also says a partial excuse can leave someone partially blameworthy, so “without excuse” is too absolute. (LLM, conf=0.88)

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Authors
Millar, B.
Affiliations
Washington University in St. Louis (US)
Corresponding author
Millar, Boyd
ORCID
Millar, Boyd
Venue
Social Epistemology
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Published
2019-10-21
Volume
33
Issue
6
Pages
525-537
ISSN
  • 0269-1728 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-5297
DOI
10.1080/02691728.2019.1676840
OpenAlex
W2980721534
Cited by
14
References
5
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1
FWCI
7.68
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Social Epistemology (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
Keywords
culpability, epistemic obligation, misinformation, social media, debunking, information environment, epistemic responsibility, internet technologies

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