Could gambling save science? Encouraging an honest consensus
Abstract
The pace of scientific progress may be hindered by the tendency of our academic institutions to reward being popular rather than being right. A market‐based alternative, where scientists can more formally ‘stake their reputation’, is presented here. It offers clear incentives to be careful and honest while contributing to a visible, self‐consistent consensus on controversial (or routine) scientific questions. In addition, it allows patrons to choose questions to be researched without choosing people or methods. The bulk of this paper is spent in examining potential problems with the proposed approach. After this examination, the idea still seems to be plausible and worthy of further study.
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Prediction markets can aggregate private information on reproducibility and can generate and disseminate a consensus among market participants.
“Prediction markets can aggregate private information on reproducibility, and can generate and disseminate a consensus among market participants.”
From Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics (2016) · cites this paper as Hanson [57]
Hanson (57) first suggested that prediction markets could be a potentially important tool for assessing scientific hypotheses.
“Hanson ( 57 ) first suggested that prediction markets could be a potentially important tool for assessing scientific hypotheses.”
From Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics (2016) · cites this paper as Hanson [57]
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References 76 · Cited by 82
- Authors
- Hanson, R.
- Affiliations
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- Corresponding author
- Hanson, Robin
- ORCID
- Hanson, Robin
- Venue
- Social Epistemology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 1995-01
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-33
- ISSN
- 0269-1728 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-5297
- OpenAlex
- W2268674374
- Cited by
- 82
- References
- 76
- Citations by year
- 2025: 4 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 2 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 13.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Social Epistemology (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Research, Science, and Academia
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Academic Publishing and Open Access
- Keywords
- scientific consensus, scientific reputation, market incentives, research funding, academic incentives, scientific honesty
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