Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences—pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory of causality that unifies its mechanistic and probabilistic aspects. We argue that the epistemic theory of causality provides the required unification.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Only by unpacking the causal arrow and studying it empirically by tracing how the mechanism works in a particular case can we make strong inferences that a causal relationship is present in a case by using what can be termed 'mechanistic evidence'.”
From Selecting Appropriate Cases When Tracing Causal Mechanisms (2018) · cites this paper as Russo and Williams, 2007
In the citing paper
“In other words, tracing mechanisms using casebased methods like process-tracing makes inferences not by assessing difference-making by varying causes and mechanisms, but instead by assessing whether there is empirical evidence in the actual case that enables us to infer the mechanism was present.”
From Selecting Appropriate Cases When Tracing Causal Mechanisms (2018) · cites this paper as Russo and Williams, 2007
In the citing paper
“Disregarding cases in quadrant III as analytically irrelevant clashes with most existing case selection guidelines.”
From Selecting Appropriate Cases When Tracing Causal Mechanisms (2018) · cites this paper as [52]
In the citing paper
“In the philosophy of science, the term 'mechanistic evidence' is used for this type of empirical material, focusing our attention on the connection between the type of empirical material used as evidence and the type of causal claim being made (Russo and Williamson, 2007; Illari, 2011).”
From It's all about mechanisms – what process-tracing case studies should be tracing (2016) · cites this paper as Russo and Williamson, 2007
In the citing paper
“Russo and Williamson (2007) and Clarke et al. (2014) have revived the arguments of Bradford Hill (1965) and Mackie (1974) to show how this can be done.”
From Identifying the characteristics of effective teacher professional development: a critical review (2021) · cites this paper as Russo and Williamson (2007)
Citations
Cites
The environment and disease: association or causation?
Hill, A. B. (2015) · Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine · doi:10.1177/0141076814562718 · Cited by 7,285
The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?
Hill, A. B. (1965) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine · doi:10.1177/003591576505800503 · Cited by 6,974
The thrifty phenotype hypothesis
Hales, C. N., & Barker, D. J. P. (2001) · British Medical Bulletin · doi:10.1093/bmb/60.1.5 · Cited by 2,738 · cited 3×
“We shall argue that although causal relations are inferred from mixed evidence, including knowledge of mechanisms and of probabilistic relations, one ought not to confuse the causal relation itself with the types of evidence used to support putative causal relationships.”
BackgroundInfluentialWilliamson, T. (2007) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470696675 · Cited by 2,277
A Probabilistic Theory of Causality.
Good, I. J., & Suppes, P. (1972) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2284742 · Cited by 1,231 · cited 2×
“Examples of such accounts include probabilistic, counterfactual and agency theories of causality (Lewis 1986 [1973]; Price 1991; Suppes 1970).”
BackgroundMode of Communication of Cholera.
Parkes, E. A. (1855) · Europe PMC (PubMed Central) · Cited by 919
On the Mode of the Communication of Cholera
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2008) · How We Reason · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551330.003.0027 · Cited by 846
(1998) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.35-6187 · Cited by 654
Dowe, P. (2000) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511570650 · Cited by 584
How Does It Work?: The Search for Explanatory Mechanisms
Bunge, M. (2004) · Philosophy of the Social Sciences · doi:10.1177/0048393103262550 · Cited by 501
Salmon, W. C. (1998) · doi:10.1093/0195108647.001.0001 · Cited by 499 · cited 2×
“of account is the Salmon-Dowe process theory ( Salmon, 1998; Dowe, 2000).”
BackgroundMethodCausation in epidemiology: Table 1
Parascandola, M., & Weed, D. L. (2001) · Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health · doi:10.1136/jech.55.12.905 · Cited by 276 · cited 3×
“In spite of this attack on causal language, recent review articles try to extrapolate a concept of cause as it is used in scientific practice (Parascandola and Weed, 2001; Lagiou et al., 2005).”
BackgroundBayesian Nets and Causality: Philosophical and Computational Foundations
Williamson, J. (2005) · Cited by 225
Self-citationFisher, R. A. (1958) · Nature · doi:10.1038/182108a0 · Cited by 150 · cited 2×
“(Frumkin 2006, 2) The crucial and equal importance of probabilistic and mechanistic considerations is recognized by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), one of the major agencies for cancer research.”
BackgroundAgency and Probabilistic Causality
PRICE, H. (1991) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/42.2.157 · Cited by 146 · cited 2×
“Examples of such accounts include probabilistic, counterfactual and agency theories of causality (Lewis 1986 [1973]; Price 1991; Suppes 1970).”
BackgroundDalton, S. O., Boesen, E. H., Ross, L., Schapiro, I. R., & Johansen, C. (2002) · European Journal of Cancer · doi:10.1016/s0959-8049(02)00099-0 · Cited by 140 · cited 2×
“(Dalton et al. 2002, 1) In the next two sections we shall discuss these two types of evidence in turn.”
BackgroundHempelian and Kuhnian approaches in the philosophy of medicine: the Semmelweis case
Gillies, D. A. (2005) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2004.12.003 · Cited by 132
Explaining Disease: Correlations, Causes, and Mechanisms
Thagard, P. R. (1998) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1023/a:1008286314688 · Cited by 129 · cited 3×
“Although the causal relation was first hypothesised on the basis of probabilistic evidence (see Warren and Marshall, quoted in Thagard 1998, 115), the causal relation was only accepted after further evidence was gathered; this evidence was probabilistic (in particular, covariation between presence…”
BackgroundInfluentialLi, C., Lozano, G., Amos, C. I., Gu, X., Strong, L. C., & Hwang, S. (2003) · Human Genetics · doi:10.1007/s00439-003-0968-7 · Cited by 115
Causality and the Interpretation of Epidemiologic Evidence
Kundi, M. (2006) · Environmental Health Perspectives · doi:10.1289/ehp.8297 · Cited by 110 · cited 8×
“(Kundi 2006, 7) This probabilistic account suffers from the epistemological problem highlighted above.”
BackgroundInfluentialCausality in cancer epidemiology
Λάγιου, Π., Adami, H., & Trichopoulos, D. (2005) · European Journal of Epidemiology · doi:10.1007/s10654-005-7968-y · Cited by 73 · cited 4×
“Witness, for instance, Lagiou et al. (2005) who propose a probabilistic understanding of cause: The following definition of a cause applies to all diseases, whether defined on the basis of a particular exposure (for example, many infectious and occupational diseases) or documented by specified…”
BackgroundInfluentialCausal Pluralism versus Epistemic Causality
Williamson, J. (2006) · Philosophica · doi:10.21825/philosophica.82198 · Cited by 73 · cited 1×
“20; Williams and Williamson 2006).”
Self-citationHandbook of Philosophical Logic
Gabbay, D. M., & Guenthner, F. (2007) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6324-4 · Cited by 71
Causal thinking and causal language in epidemiology: it's in the details
Lipton, R. I., & Ødegaard, T. (2005) · Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations · doi:10.1186/1742-5573-2-8 · Cited by 66
Fisher, R. A. (1957) · BMJ · doi:10.1136/bmj.2.5039.297-b · Cited by 63
Innovations in Bayesian Networks: Theory and Applications
Holmes, D. E. (2010) · Cited by 60
Causal propensities: Statistical causality vs. aleatory causality
Salmon, W. C. (1990) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/bf00135890 · Cited by 52 · cited 2×
“We are grateful to the British Academy and to the Fonds Spécial de Recherche (Université catholique de Louvain) for funding this project.”
BackgroundMethodCombining Argumentation and Bayesian Nets for Breast Cancer Prognosis
Williams, M., & Williamson, J. (2006) · Journal of Logic Language and Information · doi:10.1007/s10849-005-9010-x · Cited by 38 · cited 2×
“20; Williams and Williamson 2006).”
Self-citationTargeting the Epidermal Growth Factor Receptor in Colorectal Cancer: Advances and Controversies
Italiano, A. (2006) · Oncology · doi:10.1159/000093092 · Cited by 26
Dispositional versus epistemic causality
Williamson, J. (2006) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-006-9033-3 · Cited by 26 · cited 2×
“20; Williams and Williamson 2006).”
Self-citationMaruyama, W., & Aoki, Y. (2006) · Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology · doi:10.1016/j.taap.2005.12.005 · Cited by 19 · cited 3×
“If so, then causal knowledge is possible.”
BackgroundInfluentialObjective Bayesian Nets for Systems Modelling and Prognosis in Breast Cancer
Nagl, S., Williams, M., & Williamson, J. (2008) · Studies in computational intelligence · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85066-3_6 · Cited by 13 · cited 2×
“The epistemic theory of causality can be applied to the health sciences (Nagl et al. 2007, sec.”
BackgroundSelf-citationFamiliäre Brustkrebserkrankung: klinische Grundlagen und Früherkennung
Kuhl, C. K. (2006) · RöFo - Fortschritte auf dem Gebiet der Röntgenstrahlen und der bildgebenden Verfahren · doi:10.1055/s-2006-926749 · Cited by 11
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- 2006, ‘Preamble to the IARC monographs’
- Lewis D. K., 1986, Philosophical papers, 2, 159
Cited by
Glennan, S. (2017) · Oxford Scholarship Online · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779711.001.0001 · Cited by 603
Identifying the characteristics of effective teacher professional development: a critical review
Sims, S., & Fletcher-Wood, H. (2021) · School Effectiveness and School Improvement · doi:10.1080/09243453.2020.1772841 · Cited by 582
“Russo and Williamson (2007) and Clarke et al. (2014) have revived the arguments of Bradford Hill (1965) and Mackie (1974) to show how this can be done.”
BackgroundCausal mapping of human brain function
Siddiqi, S. H., Kording, K. P., Parvizi, J., & Fox, M. D. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00583-8 · Cited by 338
Causal Inference in Accounting Research
GOW, I. D., LARCKER, D. F., & REISS, P. C. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12116 · Cited by 307
The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease: New Philosophical and Scientific Developments
Bolton, D., & Gillett, G. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-11899-0 · Cited by 285
Metadata
- Authors
- Russo, F., & Williamson, J.
- Corresponding author
- Williamson, Jon
- ORCID
- Williamson, Jon
- Venue
- International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2007-07
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 157-170
- ISSN
- 0269-8595 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-9281
- OpenAlex
- W2105161006
- Cited by
- 549
- References
- 33
- Citations by year
- 2026: 37 · 2025: 35 · 2024: 57 · 2023: 39 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 59 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 56 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 28 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 19 · 2012: 14
- FWCI
- 64.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- Kent Academic Repository (University of Kent) (submittedVersion)
- Institutional Research Information System University of Ferrara (University of Ferrara) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Medicine, History, and Philosophy
- Keywords
- causality, health sciences, physical mechanisms, probabilistic dependencies, causal claims
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.