The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?
Open accessAbstract
In the roughly thirty years in which the concept legal pluralism has been used in legal and social scientific writings on complex normative systems, the concept has become a subject of emotionally loaded debates. Though originally introduced with modest ambition as a ’sensitizing’ concept, drawing attention to the probability and frequent existence of parallel or duplicatory legal regulations of the same domain of social action or organisation within one political organisation, the discussion is increasingly dominated by the exchange of conceptual a priori’s and stereotypes as well as by clichés over those who use them. Rather than looking at the heuristic value of the concept in use, for describing, analysing and evaluating empirical complex normative situations, the conceptual struggles tends to create two camps, effacing the many differences in assumptions and approaches to law in society. Starting with Tamanaha’s paper on the folly of legal pluralism (1993), one can even observe the emergence of a bogeyman called ‘the legal pluralists’ or a ‘legal pluralist movement’ (associated with the Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism and the Journal of Legal Pluralism) devoted to some romantic but ill-conceived enterprise of equalizing normative orders that are quite fundamentally different, by calling normative orders not recognized as law by the state, nevertheless ‘law’. Such concept of law, it is argued, obscures the fundamental differences in form, structure and sanctioning potential or effective sanctioning between state law and other normative orders. Others in contrast emphasise that a construction of the term law as a basic concept for historical and cross-cultural comparison nearly automatically leads to a concept that can encompass a wide range of variation, and in which law made or recognized by state institutions is one, but not the only empirical manifestation of law. Reserving the concept of law to state law only, in their eyes comes close to an essentialist and ahistorical conception of ‘law’. This paper analyses the reasons given for and against the concept legal pluralism and presents the author’s views on its value and limitation.
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Cites
Engle Merry, S. (1988) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/3053638 · Cited by 1,296
Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Ideas
Maine, H. S. (1861) · The American Law Register (1852-1891) · doi:10.2307/3302642 · Cited by 620
A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society
Tamanaha, B. Z. (2001) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244676.001.0001 · Cited by 546
Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws
Hooker, M. B. (1976) · Verfassung in Recht und Übersee · doi:10.5771/0506-7286-1976-3-400 · Cited by 399
The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics
Hoebel, E. A. (1954) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.4159/9780674038707 · Cited by 358
Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes
Merry, S. E. (1992) · Annual Review of Anthropology · doi:10.1146/annurev.an.21.100192.002041 · Cited by 271
History and Power in the Study of Law: New Directions in Legal Anthropology
(2018) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/9781501723322 · Cited by 190
von Benda‐Beckmann, F. (1988) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/3053639 · Cited by 99
von Benda‐Beckmann, F. (1989) · The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law · doi:10.1080/07329113.1989.10756410 · Cited by 50
Ethnography and Comparison in Legal Anthropology
Bohannan, P. J. (1997) · University of California Press eBooks · doi:10.1525/9780520341807-023 · Cited by 35
Cited by
Michaels, R. (2009) · Annual Review of Law and Social Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.4.110707.172311 · Cited by 363
The concept of living customary law: a critique
Diala, A. C. (2017) · The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law · doi:10.1080/07329113.2017.1331301 · Cited by 73
Valkonen, A. (2021) · Land Use Policy · doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.105191 · Cited by 56
Metadata
- Authors
- von Benda-Beckmann, F.
- Venue
- The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 47
- Pages
- 37-82
- ISSN
- 0732-9113 (ISSN-L)
- 2305-9931
- OpenAlex
- W1492791449
- Cited by
- 376
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 10.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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