The DOI matches its Crossref record; 243 of the 243 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control
Abstract
A central tenet of agency theory is that there is potential for mischief when the interests of owners and managers diverge. In those circumstances, and for a variety of reasons, managers may be able to exact higher rents than are reasonable or than the owners of the firm would otherwise accord them. While that foundational element of agency theory is secure, other elements derived directly from agency theory are far less settled. Indeed, even after some 75 years of conceptualization and empirical research, the three principal approaches that have long been proposed to mitigate the fundamental agency problem remain contentious. Accordingly, we provide a review of the fundamental agency problem and its mitigation through independence, equity, and the market for corporate control.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Items 201–243 of 243
Mergers, acquisitions, and the pruning of managerial deadwood
Walsh, J. P., & Ellwood, J. W. (1991) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250120304 · Cited by 227
Market value effects of acquisitions involving internet firms: a resource‐based analysis
Uhlenbruck, K., Hitt, M. A., & Semadeni, M. (2006) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.546 · Cited by 219
Self-citationBoard Composition and Organizational Performance: Two Studies of Insider/outsider Effects
Wagner III, J. A., Stimpert, J. L., & Fubara, E. I. (1998) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-6486.00114 · Cited by 218
Long, W. F., & Ravenscraft, D. J. (1993) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250140910 · Cited by 216
The Impact of Board Composition on Firms’ Critical Decisions: A Meta-Analytic Review
Deutsch, Y. (2005) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206304272185 · Cited by 206
Hotchkiss, E. S., & Strickland, D. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00574 · Cited by 204
Linking pay to performance—compensation proposals in the S&P 500
Morgan, A. G., & Poulsen, A. B. (2001) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00084-8 · Cited by 204
Berle and Means revisited: The governance and power of large U.S. corporations
Mizruchi, M. S. (2004) · Theory and Society · doi:10.1023/b:ryso.0000045757.93910.ed · Cited by 189
A team production model of corporate governance
Kaufman, A., & Englander, E. (2005) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/ame.2005.18733212 · Cited by 185
Origins of Corporate Governance in the USA, Sweden and France
Lubatkin, M. H., Lane, P. J., Collin, S.-O., & Very, P. (2005) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840605054602 · Cited by 181
CEO Compensation, Change, and Corporate Strategy
Dow, J., & Raposo, C. C. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00814.x · Cited by 176
Downscoping: How to Tame the Diversified Firm
Hoskisson, R. E., & Hitt, M. A. (1994) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195078435.001.0001 · Cited by 175
Self-citationAcquisition Premiums, Subsequent Workforce Reductions and Post‐Acquisition Performance
Krishnan, H. A., Hitt, M. A., & Park, D. (2007) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2006.00672.x · Cited by 172
Self-citationBradley, M., Schipani, C. A., Sundaram, A. K., & Walsh, J. P. (1999) · Law and Contemporary Problems · doi:10.2307/1192226 · Cited by 171
THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, EXIT, AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
Jensen, M. C. (1994) · Journal of Applied Corporate Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6622.1994.tb00244.x · Cited by 167
Beyond Self‐Interest Revisited*
Rocha, H. O., & Ghoshal, S. (2006) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2006.00603.x · Cited by 166
GIVING MONEY TO GET MONEY: HOW CEO STOCK OPTIONS AND CEO EQUITY ENHANCE IPO VALUATIONS.
Certo, S. T., Daily, C. M., Cannella, A. A., & Dalton, D. R. (2003) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/30040655 · Cited by 162
Self-citationDoes one hat fit all? The case of corporate leadership structure
Faleye, O. (2007) · Journal of Management & Governance · doi:10.1007/s10997-007-9028-3 · Cited by 158
CORPORATE RAIDERS AND THEIR DISCIPLINARY ROLE IN THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL.
Walsh, J. P., & Kosnik, R. D. (1993) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256755 · Cited by 157
Market reactions to announcements of corporate downsizing actions and implementation strategies
Nixon, R. D., Hitt, M. A., Lee, H., & Jeong, E. S. (2004) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.423 · Cited by 156
Self-citationBeyond Self‐Interest: Agency Theory and the Board in a Satisficing World
Hendry, J. (2005) · British Journal of Management · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8551.2005.00447.x · Cited by 153
The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History
Bratton, W. W. (1989) · Stanford Law Review · doi:10.2307/1228806 · Cited by 152
Outside Directors with a Stake: The Linchpin in Improving Governance
Hambrick, D. C., & Jackson, E. M. (2000) · California Management Review · doi:10.2307/41166056 · Cited by 152
Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance
Kang, E., & Zardkoohi, A. (2005) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00470.x · Cited by 152
Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Dalton, D. R. (1999) · Decision Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5915.1999.tb01602.x · Cited by 149
Self-citationFive steps to creating a global knowledge-sharing system: Siemens' ShareNet
Voelpel, S. C., Dous, M., & Davenport, T. H. (2005) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/ame.2005.16962590 · Cited by 139
Revue de gestion des ressources humaines
(2026) · Revue de gestion des ressources humaines · doi:10.3917/grhu · Cited by 139
The battle for the soul of capitalism
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-5992 · Cited by 138
Relational Investing And Firm Performance
Bhagat, S., Black, B. S., & Blair, M. M. (2004) · The Journal of Financial Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6803.2004.00075.x · Cited by 135
Responsible restructuring: creative and profitable alternatives to layoffs
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-0402 · Cited by 110
INCENTIVES, RATIONALITY, AND SOCIETY
Brennan, M. J. (1994) · Journal of applied corporate finance · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6622.1994.tb00403.x · Cited by 107
The effect of stock option repricing on employee turnover
Carter, M. E., & Lynch, L. J. (2003) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.06.002 · Cited by 104
Miller, D., & Breton‐Miller, I. L. (2006) · Strategic Organization · doi:10.1177/1476127006069575 · Cited by 98
Executive Option Repricing, Incentives, and Retention
Chen, M. A. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00659.x · Cited by 95
Rethinking the Influence of Agency Theory in the Accounting Academy
Cohen, J. R., & Holder-Webb, L. L. (2006) · Issues in Accounting Education · doi:10.2308/iace.2006.21.1.17 · Cited by 92
Executive Stock Option Repricing: Retention and Performance Reconsidered
Daily, C. M., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, D. R. (2002) · California Management Review · doi:10.2307/41166140 · Cited by 81
Self-citationFor Positive Management Theories While Retaining Science: Reply to Ghoshal
Donaldson, L. (2005) · Academy of Management Learning and Education · doi:10.5465/amle.2005.16132594 · Cited by 72
Just How Bad Are Our Theories? A Response to Ghoshal
Hambrick, D. C. (2005) · Academy of Management Learning and Education · doi:10.5465/amle.2005.16132585 · Cited by 69
Dalton, D. R., & Daily, C. M. (2001) · Business Ethics Quarterly · doi:10.5840/10.2307/3857871 · Cited by 59
Self-citation(2005) · Praeger eBooks · doi:10.5040/9798216190226 · Cited by 59
What Theories Do Audiences Want? Exploring the Demand Side
Kanter, R. M. (2005) · Academy of Management Learning and Education · doi:10.5465/amle.2005.16132566 · Cited by 57
Corley, K. G. (2005) · British Journal of Management · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8551.2005.00443.x · Cited by 37
Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 5.
Theodorson, G. A., Inkeles, A., Coleman, J. S., & Turner, R. H. (1981) · Contemporary Sociology A Journal of Reviews · doi:10.2307/2066860 · Cited by 27
Cited by
The Bind that Ties: Socioemotional Wealth Preservation in Family Firms
Gómez‐Mejía, L. R., Cruz, C., Berrone, P., & Castro, J. O. D. (2011) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2011.593320 · Cited by 2,230
Women on Boards and Firm Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis
Post, C., & Byron, K. (2015) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2013.0319 · Cited by 1,929
Ebrahim, A., Battilana, J., & Mair, J. (2014) · Research in Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.riob.2014.09.001 · Cited by 1,264
Corporate governance and environmental performance: is there really a link?
Walls, J. L., Berrone, P., & Phan, P. H. (2012) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.1952 · Cited by 1,160
The Too-Much-of-a-Good-Thing Effect in Management
Pierce, J. R., & Aguinis, H. (2013) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206311410060 · Cited by 1,085
Metadata
- Authors
- Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M.
- Venue
- The Academy of Management Annals
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2007-12
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-64
- ISSN
- 1941-6067 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-6520
- OpenAlex
- W4206222289
- Cited by
- 843
- References
- 243
- FWCI
- 38.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.