THE SCOPE AND GENERALITY OF AUTOMATIC AFFECTIVE BIASES IN POLITICAL THINKING: REPLY TO THE SYMPOSIUM
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Our response to this symposium on our 2006 paper centers on three questions. First, what motivations exist in the political wild, and do our experimental manipulations realistically capture them? We agree that strong accuracy motivations are likely (but not certain) to reduce biases, but we are not at all confident that the real world supplies stronger accuracy motivations than our subjects received. Second, how can we square our findings of stubbornly persistent beliefs and attitudes with the well-established literatures on framing and persuasion, which find political opinion to be more malleable? We argue that our John Q. Public theory of political information accounts for both persistence and persuasion and explains when we should expect one or the other. Citizens will be more responsive to contextual information or persuasive appeals when prior feelings are weak, knowledge is sparse, and information is encountered outside of awareness. Resistance to information or arguments is most likely when prior feelings are strong, attitudes are embedded within dense knowledge networks, and appeals are consciously perceived. Third, is belief persistence driven by feelings and emotions, as we claim, or is it more the result of a conviction that one's priors are accurate? We suggest that the distinctions that stand behind this question are suspect. We see in some of our commentators a tendency to align accuracy motivation, central processing, and cognition on one side of the dual-processing framework, with directional motivation, peripheral processing, and feelings on the other side. On the contrary, we argue that beliefs in the truth of one's priors often result from feelings and wishes and are themselves sources of motivated bias in processing new information. Moreover, directional motivations are also often a source of central processing, so it is not easy to disentangle these processes.
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Citations
Cites
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
Libet, B. (1985) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00044903 · Cited by 2,623
Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions
Bartels, L. M. (2002) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1023/a:1021226224601 · Cited by 1,468
Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind
Bartels, L. M. (2005) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592705050036 · Cited by 620 · cited 1×
“First, given the well-documented ignorance and apathy of the American voter (e.g., Bartels 2005) and the convoluted route people take to justify their beliefs and values (Haidt 2012), it isn’t clear what an ecologically appropriate set of instructions or manipulations to encourage clear and deep…”
BackgroundThe Unconscious Will: How the Pursuit of Goals Operates Outside of Conscious Awareness
Custers, R., & Aarts, H. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1188595 · Cited by 573
Cited by
Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Public Opinion Formation
Leeper, T. J., & Slothuus, R. (2014) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12164 · Cited by 722
“Indeed, Taber and Lodge (2012) maintain, “defense of one’s prior attitude is the general default when reasoning about attitudinally contrary arguments, and it takes dramatic, focused intervention to deflect people off a well-grounded attitude” (p. 249; italics in original).”
BackgroundWhy People “Don’t Trust the Evidence”: Motivated Reasoning and Scientific Beliefs
Kraft, P. W., Lodge, M., & Taber, C. S. (2015) · The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/0002716214554758 · Cited by 283
Self-citationWojcieszak, M., & Garrett, R. K. (2018) · Human Communication Research · doi:10.1093/hcr/hqx010 · Cited by 150
Wojcieszak, M., Azrout, R., & de Vreese, C. (2018) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfx040 · Cited by 37
Wojcieszak et al No Polarization from Partisan News IJPP Forthcoming
Wojcieszak, M., de Leeuw, S. E., Menchen-Trevino, E., Lee, S., Huang-Isherwood, K. M., & Weeks, B. (2021) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/hqmuy · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M.
- Venue
- Critical Review
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2012-06
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 247-268
- ISSN
- 0891-3811 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-8007
- OpenAlex
- W2011652129
- Cited by
- 16
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 0.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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