Precís of a natural history of human morality
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Here I summarize the main points in my 2016 book, A Natural History of Human Morality. Taking an evolutionary point of view, I characterize human morality as a special form of cooperation. In particular, human morality represents a kind of we > me orientation and valuation that emanates from the logic of social interdependence, both at the level of individual collaboration and at the level of the cultural group. Human morality emanates from psychological processes of shared intentionality evolved to enable individuals to function effectively in ever more cooperative lifeways.
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When morality and norms are group-specific, we believe it is the in-group who knows the 'right' way to do things, but not the other group.
“When morality and norms are group-specific, we believe it is us, the in-group, who knows the 'right' way to do things, but not the other group (Tomasello, 2018: 87).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Tomasello, 2018
Section 3, “From collaboration to culture and ‘objective’ morality” (page unavailable), says that groups develop their own norms, treat them as defining right and wrong, and regard them as how “we” regulate “us.” It also says only members of one’s cultural group could be counted on to share its values. It does not say that people believe other groups do not know the right way to do things; that part is stronger than the source supports. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredCultural markers indicate who belongs to the same or similar cultural group and who is likely to share one's taken-for-granted knowledge, norms and morality.
“Cultural markers indicate who belongs to the same or similar cultural group and who is likely to share one's taken-for-granted knowledge, norms and morality (Henrich, 2016: 201;Tomasello, 2018: 91).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Tomasello, 2018
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Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Darwall, S. (2006). The second-person standpoint: Respect, morality, and accountability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gilbert, M. (2003). The structure of the social atom: Joint commitment as the foundation of human social behavior. In F. Schmitt (Ed.), Socializing metaphysics (pp. 39-64).
- Korsgaard, C. (1996). The sources of normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scanlon, T. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
- West-Eberhardt, M. J. (1979). Sexual selection, social competition, and evolution. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 51(4), 222-234.
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Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality
Windzio, M. (2026) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-026-09531-2
- Authors
- Tomasello, M.
- Affiliations
- Duke University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tomasello, Michael
- ORCID
- Tomasello, Michael
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2018-07-04
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 661-668
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W2888541458
- Cited by
- 18
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 3
- FWCI
- 3.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Philosophical Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- human morality, evolution of morality, cooperation, social interdependence, shared intentionality, moral valuation, evolutionary psychology
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