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Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace
Abstract
It is widely believed that cyberspace is offense dominant because of technical characteristics that undermine deterrence and defense. This argument mistakes the ease of deception on the Internet for a categorical ease of attack. As intelligence agencies have long known, deception is a double-edged sword. Covert attackers must exercise restraint against complex targets in order to avoid compromises resulting in mission failure or retaliation. More importantly, defenders can also employ deceptive concealment and ruses to confuse or ensnare aggressors. Indeed, deception can reinvigorate traditional strategies of deterrence and defense against cyber threats, as computer security practitioners have already discovered. The strategy of deception has other important implications: as deterrence became foundational in the nuclear era, deception should rise in prominence in a world that increasingly depends on technology to mediate interaction.
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In the citing paper
“Gartzke & Lindsay (2015) further argue that offense is not even necessarily cheaper in the cyber domain.”
From Do Emerging Military Technologies Matter for International Politics? (2020) · cites this paper as Gartzke & Lindsay 2015
In the citing paper
“More generally, advances in attribution limit the deception advantages for cyber attackers, while defenders can also use deception to try to entrap attackers-both defeating an attack and identifying the attacker (Gartzke & Lindsay 2015).”
From Do Emerging Military Technologies Matter for International Politics? (2020) · cites this paper as Gartzke & Lindsay 2015
In the citing paper
“The need for attacks to stay covert in situations short of war imposes operational limitations, while defenders can use forms of concealment and spoofing to try to deceive attackers.”
From Do Emerging Military Technologies Matter for International Politics? (2020) · cites this paper as Gartzke & Lindsay 2015
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gartzke, E., & Lindsay, J. R.
- Venue
- Security Studies
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2015-04-03
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 316-348
- ISSN
- 0963-6412 (ISSN-L)
- 1556-1852
- OpenAlex
- W1576087156
- Cited by
- 287
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 38 · 2025: 46 · 2024: 57 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 46 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 1
- FWCI
- 52.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Security Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
- Keywords
- cyber deception, cyber deterrence, cyber defense, offensive cyber operations, stealthy attacks, cybersecurity strategy, cybersecurity
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