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The institutional design of joint bodies in trade agreements: monitoring commitments, facilitating negotiations, avoiding ratification

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Gastinger, Markus, Dür, Andreas·2026·Review of International Political Economy
DOI 10.1080/09692290.2026.2656366
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Abstract

Nearly all preferential trade agreements (PTAs) establish ‘joint bodies’ (JBs), such as a Free Trade Commission or Joint Committee, to facilitate effective implementation. While all joint bodies foresee interactions between governments during implementation, they vary considerably in their degree of institutionalization: Some envisage frequent meetings at more senior levels once the agreement enters into force, and only some are empowered to take binding decisions. What accounts for this variation in institutionalization across joint bodies? We argue that greater institutionalization supports governments by enabling them to better monitor the faithful implementation of commitments, facilitate negotiations over outstanding issues, and reduce the need for renewed domestic ratification during implementation. We find robust support for this argument through a quantitative analysis of original data and a qualitative case study of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA). Our study contributes to the literature on the design of PTAs and international institutions.

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Metadata

Authors
Gastinger, M., & Dür, A.
Affiliations
University of Salzburg (AT)
Corresponding author
Gastinger, Markus
ORCID
Venue
Review of International Political Economy
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Published
2026-04-20
Volume
33
Issue
5
Pages
2148-2179
ISSN
  • 0969-2290 (ISSN-L)
  • 1466-4526
DOI
10.1080/09692290.2026.2656366
OpenAlex
W7155029334
Cited by
1
References
47
Citations by year
2026: 1
FWCI
19.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
Review of International Political Economy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • Austrian Science Fund (M 3285-G)
  • European Research Council (724107)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › World Trade Organization Law
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Global trade and economics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
Keywords
preferential trade agreements, institutional design, institutionalization, trade agreement implementation, trade negotiations, ratification, Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, international institutions

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