Lobbying activity and fora creation in the EU: empirically exploring the nature of the policy good
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper presents a quantitative look at lobbying activity and the emergence of institutional fora in the European Union (EU). Specifically, the paper explores why the number of interest representatives differs across policy domains, and why we find institutionalized fora for interest representation for some policy issues but not others. Building on a strategic lobbying model, the paper shows empirically that Commission activity influences interest group activity, and that increased activity leads to the creation of fora. This conforms to our assertion that the creation of lobbying insiders is a reaction to lobbying overload. We also find that distributive policy domains have fewer lobbying groups than regulatory policy domains. This is unsurprising, considering that regulation is the area of greatest EU policy output. Conversely, lower levels of lobbying activity in distributive policy domains indicate that these are still highly intergovernmental and encourage multi-level venue shopping.
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Citations
Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036932 · Cited by 638 · cited 2×
“In the world of formal models of communication (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; Lupia and McCubbins 1997), this is called ‘babbling’ – the lobbyists (or the ‘senders’ of information) provide a standard recommendation, independent of whether the information recipient (here the Commission) may ag…”
Background
Cited by
Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying
Coen, D. (2007) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501760701243731 · Cited by 365
Self-citationWho consults? The configuration of expert groups in the European union
Gornitzka, Å., & Sverdrup, U. (2008) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/01402380801905991 · Cited by 258
Jordan, N. D. (2021) · The International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment · doi:10.1007/s11367-021-01873-6 · Cited by 11
Learning from Practical Experience: Implementation Epistemic Communities in the European Union
Polman, D. (2018) · International Series on Public Policy · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-76210-4_6 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Broscheid, A., & Coen, D.
- Venue
- Journal of European Public Policy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2007-04
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 346-365
- ISSN
- 1350-1763 (ISSN-L)
- 1466-4429
- OpenAlex
- W2167985639
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 24.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Broscheid, A., & Coen, D. (2007). Lobbying activity and fora creation in the EU: empirically exploring the nature of the policy good. Journal of European Public Policy. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760701243749
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.