Foreign aid and political conditionality: Issues of effectiveness and consistency
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Abstract
This article examines the implementation of political conditionality by four official aid donors in the 1990s. It explores the aid sanctions taken globally to leverage improvements in respect of human rights and democratic principles, and assesses donor policy practice along two lines of investigation ‐ effectiveness and consistency. A main finding is the ineffectiveness of aid restrictions in contributing to political reforms in recipient countries. This is accounted for more by the weakness of measures imposed than by the strength of recipient governments, questioning the seriousness of donor intent in many cases. Regarding consistency, a pattern of selective and inconsistent policy application is revealed. The increased rhetorical support for democracy and human rights by northern governments post‐cold war has not led to a corresponding change towards the fair and equal treatment of all nations. The continued subordination of human rights and democracy to other foreign policy concerns, notably economic self‐interest, not only undermines policy credibility and legitimacy, but also limits impact and effectiveness. Donors themselves have introduced a normative dimension to aid policy. Yet if their own commitment to the principles of human rights and democracy is at best partial, they can hardly require development partners to abide by them in a manner that commands respect.
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Citations
Cited by
Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross‐Country Empirical Tests
Knack, S. (2001) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.1002/j.2325-8012.2001.tb00421.x · Cited by 737
Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa
Goldsmith, A. A. (2001) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081801551432 · Cited by 291
Court, J., & Maxwell, S. (2005) · Journal of International Development · doi:10.1002/jid.1234 · Cited by 54
Who depends on whom? Uganda's refugee 'success story', corruption and the international community
Titeca, K. (2022) · Third World Quarterly · doi:10.1080/01436597.2021.1989301 · Cited by 12
“Donor measures are implemented selectively and inconsistently, and aid conditionalities are subordinated to other foreign policy concerns (Crawford 1997, 69), of which three stand out: economic interests, security and political stability (Brown 2005, 2011).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Crawford, G.
- Venue
- Democratization
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 1997-09
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 69-108
- ISSN
- 1351-0347 (ISSN-L)
- 1743-890X
- OpenAlex
- W2132806807
- Cited by
- 200
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 15.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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