Effects of training and instruction on analytic and belief-based reasoning processes
Abstract
Two studies are reported which demonstrate that analytic responding on everyday reasoning problems can be increased and bias eliminated after training on the law of large numbers (Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986 Fong, G. T., Krantz, D. H. and Nisbett, R. E. 1986. The effects of statistical training on thinking about everyday problems. Cognitive Psychology, 18: 253–292. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Critical thinking problems involving belief-consistent, neutral, and inconsistent conclusions were presented. Belief bias was eliminated when a written justification of argument strength was elicited. However, belief-based responding was still evident when evaluations of the arguments were elicited using rating scales. This finding demonstrates a dissociation between analytic and belief-based responding as a function of response format. In Experiment 2 an instructional condition designed to foster decontextualised reasoning was included but was ineffective in reducing the degree to which judgements were biased by beliefs. It was concluded that training which makes available the analytic strategies necessary to evaluate a problem has the potential to facilitate performance only if the requested response triggers conscious deliberation of the evidence.
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Informing people of biases is simply not enough to improve judgment.
“Informing people of biases is simply not enough (Neilens, Handley & Newstead, 2009; Wegener & Petty, 1997).”
From Developing expert political judgment: The impact of training and practice on judgmental accuracy in geopolitical forecasting tournaments (2016) · cites this paper as Neilens, Handley & Newstead, 2009
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Chang, W., Chen, E., Mellers, B., & Tetlock, P. (2016) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500004599 · Cited by 89 · see citing works
“Informing people of biases is simply not enough (Neilens, Handley & Newstead, 2009; Wegener & Petty, 1997).”
- Authors
- Neilens, H. L., Handley, S. J., & Newstead, S. E.
- Affiliations
- University of Plymouth (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Neilens, Helen L.
- Venue
- Thinking & Reasoning
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2009-01-21
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 37-68
- ISSN
- 1354-6783 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0708
- OpenAlex
- W2094805464
- Cited by
- 11
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2018: 1 · 2016: 2 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 0.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Thinking & Reasoning (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Education › Education and Critical Thinking Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Educational Strategies and Epistemologies
- Keywords
- belief bias, analytical thinking, critical thinking, argument evaluation, response format
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