Hypothesis-Testing Strategies: Why two Goals are Better than One
Abstract
An intriguing finding in the hypothesis-testing literature concerns a large increase in the proportion of subjects who discover a rule when they are asked to determine two rules rather than that rule alone. This finding is based on Wason's (1960) “2 4 6” task, in which subjects try to discover a rule (ascending numbers) by generating and testing number triples. They are initially given an example (“2, 4, 6”) of the rule that leads to overly specific hypotheses. With single-goal (SG) instructions, subjects try to discover the correct rule and are told whether each triple proposed fits the rule. With dual-goal (DG) instructions, correct and incorrect categories are labelled, respectively, as DAX and MED. Subjects try to discover both rules and are told whether each proposed triple is DAX or MED. Two explanations of why DG subjects do better at rule discovery than SG subjects are tested: the quantity of information and the testing of complementary rules using the prevalent positive-test strategy. Results support the latter explanation: DG subjects outperform SG subjects only if they know the rules are complementary, and that SG subjects’ performance does not improve when required to test more triples before announcing their first rule. A third explanation, the positivity of the linguistic label of the feedback, is ruled out. Understanding the superiority of DG instructions might suggest a general method for enhancing rule discovery.
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It is also consistent with the general reasoning literature: considering an alternative, accessible, and plausible explanation is more likely to debias judgements.
“It is also consistent with the general reasoning literature: considering an alternative, accessible, and plausible explanation is more likely to debias judgements (Hirt & Markman, 1995; Wharton, Cheng, & Wickens, 1993; Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002; Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004).”
From A counterweight model for understanding and treating persecutory delusions. (2025) · cites this paper as Wharton, Cheng, & Wickens, 1993
Cites
Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y.-W. (1987) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.94.2.211 · Cited by 2,094 · see citing works
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A counterweight model for understanding and treating persecutory delusions.
Freeman, D., Isham, L., & Waite, F. (2025) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291725001242 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
- Authors
- Wharton, C. M., Cheng, P. W., & Wickens, T. D.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Los Angeles (US)
- ORCID
- Cheng, Patricia W.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1993-11
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 743-758
- ISSN
- 0272-4987 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0740
- OpenAlex
- W2086180711
- Cited by
- 38
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 2
- FWCI
- 0.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Keywords
- hypothesis testing, rule discovery, hypothesis generation, confirmation bias
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