Cited by 38Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsCategorization, perception, and languageCognitive Science and Education Research

Hypothesis-Testing Strategies: Why two Goals are Better than One

Wharton, Charles M., Cheng, Patricia W., Wickens, Thomas D.·1993·The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A

Abstract

An intriguing finding in the hypothesis-testing literature concerns a large increase in the proportion of subjects who discover a rule when they are asked to determine two rules rather than that rule alone. This finding is based on Wason's (1960) “2 4 6” task, in which subjects try to discover a rule (ascending numbers) by generating and testing number triples. They are initially given an example (“2, 4, 6”) of the rule that leads to overly specific hypotheses. With single-goal (SG) instructions, subjects try to discover the correct rule and are told whether each triple proposed fits the rule. With dual-goal (DG) instructions, correct and incorrect categories are labelled, respectively, as DAX and MED. Subjects try to discover both rules and are told whether each proposed triple is DAX or MED. Two explanations of why DG subjects do better at rule discovery than SG subjects are tested: the quantity of information and the testing of complementary rules using the prevalent positive-test strategy. Results support the latter explanation: DG subjects outperform SG subjects only if they know the rules are complementary, and that SG subjects’ performance does not improve when required to test more triples before announcing their first rule. A third explanation, the positivity of the linguistic label of the feedback, is ruled out. Understanding the superiority of DG instructions might suggest a general method for enhancing rule discovery.

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Crossref · 10.1080/14640749308401037

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1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • It is also consistent with the general reasoning literature: considering an alternative, accessible, and plausible explanation is more likely to debias judgements.

    “It is also consistent with the general reasoning literature: considering an alternative, accessible, and plausible explanation is more likely to debias judgements (Hirt & Markman, 1995; Wharton, Cheng, & Wickens, 1993; Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002; Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004).”

    From A counterweight model for understanding and treating persecutory delusions. (2025) · cites this paper as Wharton, Cheng, & Wickens, 1993

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Authors
Wharton, C. M., Cheng, P. W., & Wickens, T. D.
Affiliations
University of California, Los Angeles (US)
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A
Published
1993-11
Volume
46
Issue
4
Pages
743-758
ISSN
  • 0272-4987 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-0740
OpenAlex
W2086180711
Cited by
38
References
1
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 2
FWCI
0.83
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
Keywords
hypothesis testing, rule discovery, hypothesis generation, confirmation bias

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