Simulation trouble.
Open accessAbstract
I present arguments against both explicit and implicit versions of the simulation theory for intersubjective understanding. Logical, developmental, and phenomenological evidence counts against the concept of explicit simulation if this is to be understood as the pervasive or default way that we understand others. The concept of implicit (subpersonal) simulation, identified with neural resonance systems (mirror systems or shared representations), fails to be the kind of simulation required by simulation theory, because it fails to explain how neuronal processes meet constraints that involve instrumentality and pretense. Implicit simulation theory also fails to explain how I can attribute a mental or emotion state that is different from my own to another person. I also provide a brief indication of an alternative interpretation of neural resonance systems.
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It casts some doubts on simulation accounts of empathy.
“It also casts some doubts on simulation accounts of empathy, which claim that the commonalities in the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex indicate the actual emotion sharing between observer and target (see also [70]).”
From What are you feeling? Using functional magnetic resonance imaging to assess the modulation of sensory and affective responses during empathy for pain (2007) · cites this paper as [70]
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References 39 · Cited by 158
- Authors
- Gallagher, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Central Florida (US)
- Corresponding author
- Gallagher, Shaun
- ORCID
- Gallagher, Shaun
- Venue
- Social Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2007-09
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 3-4
- Pages
- 353-365
- ISSN
- 1747-0919 (ISSN-L)
- 1747-0927
- OpenAlex
- W4250622862
- Cited by
- 158
- References
- 39
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 4 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 19 · 2012: 13
- FWCI
- 14.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Locations
- Social Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research (submittedVersion)
- University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Keywords
- simulation theory, intersubjectivity, mirror system, shared representations, neural resonance, pretense, instrumentality, mental state attribution, emotional understanding, phenomenology of understanding, developmental psychology
- MeSH terms
- Emotions, Humans, Nerve Net, Psychological Theory, Social Perception, Comprehension
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