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The self as a moral agent: Linking the neural bases of social agency and moral sensitivity

Moll, Jorge, Oliveira-Souza, Ricardo de, Garrido, Griselda J., Bramati, Ivanei E., Caparelli-Daquer, Egas M. A., Paiva, Mirella L. M. F., Zahn, Roland, Grafman, Jordan · 2007 · Social Neuroscience

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 79 of the 79 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The human brain is inherently able to understand the world in moral ways, endowing most of us with an intuitive sense of fairness, concern for others, and observance of cultural norms. We have argued that this moral sensitivity ability depends on a sophisticated integration of cognitive, emotional, and motivational mechanisms, which are modulated by individual experience in different cultural milieus. Different lines of investigation on agency and morality have pointed to overlapping neural systems. Therefore, understanding the relationships between morality and agency may provide key insights into the mechanisms underlying human behavior in several clinical and societal settings. We used functional MRI to investigate the contribution of agency and of specific moral emotions to brain activation using action scripts. Results showed that emotionally neutral agency recruited neural networks previously associated with agency, intentionality and moral cognition, encompassing ventral and subgenual sectors of the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC), insula, anterior temporal cortex and superior temporal sulcus (STS). Compared to emotionally neutral agency, different categories of moral emotions led to distinct activation patterns: (1) prosocial emotions (guilt, embarrassment, compassion) activated the anterior medial PFC and STS, with (2) empathic emotions (guilt and compassion) additionally recruiting the mesolimbic pathway; (3) other-critical emotions (disgust and indignation) were associated with activation of the amygdala-parahippocampal and fusiform areas. These findings indicate that agency related to norm-abiding social behaviors of emotionally neutral scripts share neural substrates both with the "default mode" of brain function and with the moral sensitivity network. Additional activation in specific components of this network is elicited by different classes of moral emotions, in agreement with recent integrative models of moral cognition and emotion.

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Crossref · 10.1080/17470910701392024

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79 of 79 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 79 references

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Fessler D., 1999, Beyond nature or nurture: Biocultural approaches to the emotions, 75
  2. Moll J., Moral psychology. Vol. 3: Morals and the brain
  3. Nauta W. J., 1960, Physiol Rev Suppl, 4, 102
  4. 10.1002/(sici)1097-0193(1996)4:1<58::aid-hbm4>3.0.co;2-o · doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-0193(1996)4:1<58::aid-hbm4>3.0.co;2-o

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Metadata

Authors
Moll, J., Oliveira-Souza, R. D., Garrido, G. J., Bramati, I. E., Caparelli-Daquer, E. M. A., Paiva, M. L. M. F., Zahn, R., & Grafman, J.
Affiliations
  • National Institutes of Health (US)
  • Hospital Israelita Albert Einstein (BR)
Corresponding author
Moll, Jorge
Venue
Social Neuroscience
Published
2007-09
Volume
2
Issue
3-4
Pages
336-352
ISSN
  • 1747-0919 (ISSN-L)
  • 1747-0927
OpenAlex
W2153288884
Cited by
220
References
79
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 15 · 2012: 14
FWCI
6.16
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Social Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Research Explorer (The University of Manchester) (publishedVersion)
  • Research Portal (King's College London) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
moral agency, moral sensitivity, moral emotions, prosocial emotions, empathic emotions, guilt, compassion, disgust, indignation, embarrassment, medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus, insula, amygdala, mesolimbic system, default mode network, moral cognition
MeSH terms
Adolescent, Adult, Brain, Brain Mapping, Emotions, Female, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Male, Morals, Nerve Net, Self Concept, Social Perception, Moral Development

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The self as a moral agent: Linking the neural bases of social agency and moral sensitivity. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/17470910701392024
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Moll, J., Oliveira-Souza, R. D., Garrido, G. J., Bramati, I. E., Caparelli-Daquer, E. M. A., Paiva, M. L. M. F., Zahn, R., & Grafman, J. (2007). The self as a moral agent: Linking the neural bases of social agency and moral sensitivity. Social Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470910701392024

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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